

Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

OCTOBER, 1972

THE SOVIET UNION, 1972

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Current History

OCTOBER, 1972

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How has the foreign policy of the Soviet Union changed in the 1970's? What is the political and economic situation in the Soviet Union? In this issue, seven specialists explore the Soviet scene today. Analyzing the Sino-Soviet conflict, our first article notes that "the rivalry of the national and state interests of the two countries . . . has grown more crude and naked, and is steadily expanding everywhere on the political, economic, and military level."

The Sino-Soviet Conflict in Soviet Eyes

BY HARRY GELMAN

Political Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency

OVER THE YEARS, there have been two fundamental transformations in the way the Soviets have come to look at their Chinese problem. One results from the changing Sino-Soviet bilateral geopolitical and military relationship, while the second stems from major changes in the terms under which the U.S.S.R.'s world-wide competition with the Chinese is conducted. Although any separating of the interwoven strands in Soviet thinking must be somewhat arbitrary, an examination of some past events from these two aspects may help explain certain present Soviet behavior.

The first crude fact to which the Soviets now respond, of course, is that a fundamental apparent geopolitical change—once thought by some in the West and hoped by some in the East to have taken place in 1949–1950—has proven illusory. This was the supposed establishment of a permanent alliance between two Communist giants sprawling across most of Eurasia, extending the Soviet reach throughout the Far East and tripling the population of the hostile "Socialist (Communist) camp" facing the West. But instead of the maturing of such an alliance, the long-term result of the Chinese Communist conquest of power has been the creation of a new and growing strategic rival to the Soviet Union. In many respects—China's vast population, her uncomfortable geographic proximity, her territorial claims on the

U.S.S.R., her seemingly implacable animosity, and her disciplined and purposeful subordination of the national will to anti-Soviet ends—China must now seem to Moscow to be a competitor as formidable in her own way as the United States.

(There are good reasons to believe that Stalin himself had few illusions about the Chinese alliance, and that he had grave doubts, fostered by two decades of troubled relations with Chinese Chairman Mao Tse-tung, as to whether a Mao-controlled China could become a reliable instrument of Soviet policy.) The old dictator characteristically sought to secure the most he could against the possibility of Chinese unreliability by driving a hard bargain at the outset of Mao's coming to power: concrete political, economic and military extraterritorial gains from the new Chinese alliance, in exchange for Soviet aid to Chinese industrialization.¹ But, in any event, these tangible Soviet acquisitions were sacrificed soon after Stalin's death, along with more intangible Soviet advantages of authority and prestige which were associated with Stalin's long-dominant personality. For in the five years after Stalin's demise, the new, insecure Soviet collective leadership took a series of steps regarding the Chinese which in retrospect seem like increasingly inadequate attempts to propitiate them.

(In a sense, these conciliatory measures toward China by Stalin's heirs were only one aspect of a larger revamping of the harsh outlines of Stalin's foreign policies, and thus coincided with such steps (among many others) as the first reconciliation of Yugoslavia, the signing of the Austrian treaty, and

¹ These included, most notably, the three 1950 agreements giving the U.S.S.R. bases at Port Arthur and Dairen, and joint participation with the Chinese in exploiting railways in the northeast and petroleum and metals in Sinkiang.

the return of Porkkala to Finland.) (But, more important, the post-Stalin leaders probably adopted a conciliatory posture toward Peking because they sensed that without the aura of authority with which Stalin had confronted Mao, they had no choice if they wished to preserve the alliance.)

The measures in question included the surrender of the naval bases and other extraterritorial rights which Stalin had wrung from Mao, public apologies by *Pravda* for the harsh way in which Stalin had treated Chinese Communist sympathizers like Anna Louise Strong, public intimations by some Soviet leaders that China enjoyed a near-equal status with the Soviet Union at the apex of the Communist bloc and the world Communist movement and, finally—most significant of all—apparent increased aid to Chinese weapons development.) (This last concession may have reached its culmination in a new military agreement signed in October, 1957, which, Peking subsequently indicated, committed the U.S.S.R. to decisive assistance in Chinese nuclear weapons programs.) (It was apparently the Soviet hope in taking these measures to provide greater and greater incentives to the Chinese: on the one hand to maintain the alliance, and, on the other, to refrain from challenging Soviet domination of the rest of the Communist world or from undercutting the main goals of Soviet foreign policy.)

All this was in vain. Even while the Soviets were trying to secure Peking's good will, they received repeated indications that the Chinese had a different emotional world-view and that Peking's state interests diverged in many respects from those of Moscow. Such evidence was apparently furnished by self-assertive Chinese conduct behind the scenes during the de-Stalinization crises of 1956, and at the meeting of ruling Communist parties in Moscow in November, 1957.² It seems, however, that Chinese intentions and ambitions were made fully manifest to the Soviets only in 1958. (This was the year in which the Chinese raised an implicit but deeply resented challenge to Soviet primacy in the Communist world by claiming to have found a short-cut to communism through the people's communes.) (In that same year, it will be recalled, the Chinese on two particular occasions exerted unwelcome pressure on Soviet foreign policy to secure greater Soviet risk-taking toward the United States: first, in the summer, concerning the Middle East, and second, in the summer and fall, over the Taiwan Strait crisis.)

It is noteworthy that it was at about this time, in

(1958, that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev appears to have returned to Stalin's policy of attempting to secure concrete military-strategic concessions from Peking as a condition for continued cooperation in the alliance.) For the Chinese have since asserted, and the Soviets have not denied, that in this period the Soviets made specific military demands upon them. (One demand was said to be a proposal for the establishment of a joint Sino-Soviet military radio system, with majority control vested in the U.S.S.R.; another was a request that the two countries pool forces to form a "combined naval squadron" in the Far East.³)

To the Soviets, such requests may have seemed both justified and necessary: justified as part payment for the economic and military assistance the Chinese were expecting and the foreign policy support they were seeking from the U.S.S.R., and necessary as providing a means of restraining and controlling Chinese initiatives which might confront the U.S.S.R. with undesired risks. But to Mao, Khrushchev's secret demands seem to have been regarded as completely unacceptable attempts to infringe on Chinese sovereignty or, as Peking later put it rhetorically, "to put China under Soviet military control." In response to apparent Chinese rejection, it was less than a year later, in June, 1959, according to Chinese claims, that Khrushchev refused to furnish Peking with a promised "sample of an atomic bomb," and thus "unilaterally tore up" the military aid agreement of October, 1957.

POLICY SHIFT

It may be significant that Khrushchev made this shift in 1958, back toward Stalin's policy of seeking military concessions from and constraints upon China, at a moment when his personal power in the Soviet leadership was much greater than it had been a short time previously, and considerably greater than it was to be a few years later. For it had only been a year before, in June, 1957, that Khrushchev had succeeded in expelling from the leadership the "anti-party group" of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov; thereafter the evolution of Soviet policy toward the Chinese came to be more and more directly affected by Khrushchev's impetuous personality.

When Khrushchev finally fell, in October, 1964, it was reported in the Western press that one of the charges leveled at him by his colleagues was that his harsh manner of dealing with the Chinese had unduly exacerbated the conflict with Peking. However, when the post-Khrushchev leadership apparently encountered even greater difficulties in their relations with the Chinese, much less was heard of this charge against Khrushchev. Especially after the 1969 clashes on the Sino-Soviet border, it seems possible that at least some Soviet leaders may have come to feel that

² For details, see H. Gelman, "The Conflict: A Survey," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, D.C.), March-April, 1964, especially pp. 4-6.

³ *Mainichi* (Tokyo), January 26, 1972. See also the Chinese government statement, September 1, 1963. (New China News Agency, August 31, 1963.)

the initial post-Stalin policy of seeking to conciliate and build up the Chinese with military and economic assistance had been a historic mistake.

THE SHIFTING POLITICAL TERMS OF CONFLICT

Against this background of a virtual reversal of the military relationship with Peking, the second major change in the Soviet view of the Chinese antagonist reflects the gradual metamorphosis in the political terms of the Sino-Soviet competition around the world over the last 15 years. In this contest, many of the issues originally fought over seem to have grown less relevant, some arenas once fought in have been largely abandoned, and some of the audiences appealed to have been superseded. The differences between Moscow and Peking are still today often voiced in ideological terms, but the real ideological gap between the two is now smaller in certain respects than it has been in many years.

This development is, of course, part and parcel of the fact that the rivalry of the national and state interests of the two countries—always a vital, visible element in the clash of opposing ideologies and policies—has grown more crude and naked, and is steadily expanding everywhere on the political, economic, and military level. Reflecting this shift of focus, Sino-Soviet competition for influence among non-Communist governments and leaders, always important, has now become much more so, while the old struggle for the allegiance of Communists everywhere seems to have become less central. And, finally, while the personal vendetta between Mao and Khrushchev—which certainly gave a special impetus and bitterness to the conflict in the early 1960's—ceased to animate the dispute after Khrushchev's political demise in 1964, much if not all of the hostility the two men engendered seems to have flowed on into the widening channel of state rivalry.

These shifts in the issues and battlegrounds of Sino-Soviet conflict have taken place in discrete stages. In the first phase, extending roughly from 1957 through 1962, the Soviets seemed to see the main thrust of Chinese policy as an attempt to bring pressure on Soviet policy from *inside* the confines of the "Socialist camp" and the world Communist movement. The Soviets viewed the underlying Chinese purpose as an effort to make the words and actions of the Soviet Union and the states, parties and organizations it controlled conform to Chinese perceptions of Chinese Communist national interests, instead of to Soviet national interests.

Conditioned above all by the Taiwan issue, Peking's view of its needs after 1957 apparently required that the maximum possible pressure be brought to bear on the United States and its friends and interests in all parts of the world. The Chinese apparently argued forcefully to this end at the November, 1957, Moscow

meeting of the ruling Communist parties, and again at the November, 1960, meeting in Moscow of the world's Communist parties.

In attempting to use the Communist movement as a lever against Moscow, the Chinese of course did not justify the line they were urging in terms of their own interests, but rather in universal ideological terms calculated to appeal to the Communist audience they were then primarily addressing. That is, they spoke publicly and privately of the obligation to take the offensive against "imperialism" everywhere, to find "national liberation movements" in need of support and to support them, to prepare everywhere for eventual obligatory armed revolutions, and to maintain a general atmosphere of tension and struggle. A decade later, the Soviets were to emphasize—with some justification—that some of these supposedly eternal verities had come to be modified by the Chinese themselves.

As early as 1958, a principal vehicle for these Chinese pressures on Soviet foreign policy toward the West had come to be a Chinese campaign seeking to force Khrushchev to ostracize the Yugoslavs, who symbolized for both Moscow and Peking an alternative policy of relaxation of tension and détente with the United States—the reverse of what Peking was then demanding. The Chinese apparently feared that another Soviet rapprochement with Belgrade, in the face of Yugoslav heresies, would presage a Soviet turn toward the United States.

These fears were justified. By mid-1958, Khrushchev was already openly calling for an abatement of the new bloc campaign against the Yugoslavs, a call to which the Chinese proved deaf. Beginning almost simultaneously and extending over the next 12 months, there took place the basic reorientation already described in the Soviet Union's view of its military-strategic relationship to China. Like the turning of a giant pivot, this movement of Soviet policy away from the conciliation of China was soon followed, in the fall of 1959, by the Khrushchev visit to the United States and by the "spirit of Camp David," a dramatic rejection of the foreign policy line embodied in Peking's attacks on the Yugoslavs. The Chinese response, in the spring of 1960, was to open a series of epoch-making public attacks upon Khrushchev's détente policies.

INTERNAL SOVIET PRESSURES

What may have been particularly grave for Khrushchev personally about this initial Chinese campaign of 1960 was the fact that it appealed directly to the private interests of those Communist states and parties which, like China, had special reasons of their own to regret and oppose Khrushchev's conciliation of the United States, and therefore had some reason to sympathize with the Chinese challenge to Soviet

Communist authority over this issue. (These included, most notably, North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania and the Communist parties of Japan and Indonesia.) For this reason, to members of the Soviet leadership who may have been lukewarm about the détente policy to start with,⁴ the threat to Soviet influence created in important segments of the Communist world by the Chinese attacks made Khrushchev's détente line seem like an unacceptable luxury. The thesis seems justified that faced with these external and internal pressures, and concerned to salvage what he could of his own power position, Khrushchev led the way in a series of sporadic policy retreats from détente, which were sometimes misinterpreted at the time in the West as expressions of his own desires.

RETREATS FROM DÉTENTE

The first and most spectacular of these responses to Politburo doubters and Chinese pressures was Khrushchev's torpedoing of the May, 1960, summit conference in the aftermath of the U-2 incident. There followed a considerable hardening of the Soviet line in support of "national liberation movements," and at the same time a distinct momentary cooling toward the Yugoslavs and all they represented. In October, 1960, Khrushchev made his well-remembered gesture of removing his shoe at the United Nations and hammering with it during a debate on colonialism, an action which can be regarded as a defensive and theatrical attempt to demonstrate to critics that, contrary to Chinese allegations, he was really a fierce anti-colonial fighter and revolutionary. Finally, it was in the process of responding to the Chinese polemical attacks of 1960 that the Soviets began to emphasize that peaceful coexistence did not, after all, mean a relaxation of their ideological struggle against the capitalist world—a relaxation which had certainly been implied by the tone taken by Khrushchev and the Soviet press in the fall of 1959, in the period of the "spirit of Camp David"—but rather, the intensification of that struggle. To the present day, the Soviets continue to justify any conciliatory moves to-

ward the West by reiterating to any orthodox doubters inside and outside the Soviet Union this incantation of militant principle.⁵

These defensive Soviet adjustments to vulnerabilities created by Chinese pressures should not, of course, obscure the fact that the Soviets at their own volition—and Khrushchev in particular—had for several years been striving to extend Soviet influence among newly independent, formerly colonial countries at the expense of the West and of the United States.⁶ The point at issue between the Soviets and the Chinese—and within the Soviet leadership—was not whether efforts to expel Western influence from former colonial states should be pushed, but rather the degree to which support of revolutionary armed struggles in the "third world" should be allowed to inhibit Khrushchev's simultaneous efforts to improve the atmosphere of relations with the United States. Over time, the Soviet consensus on this point has been a series of leadership compromises, fluctuating with circumstances and the Soviet stakes involved, designed to try to get the best of both worlds: revolutionary credit and détente.

THE CHINESE OPT OUT

With the struggle among the world's Communists thus centered principally on the question of Khrushchev's policies toward the United States after 1960, the Soviets eventually discovered that the Chinese (had far greater success in damaging Soviet authority than they did in recruiting followers for their own banner.) For the situation in what had been the world Communist movement eventually tended to become stabilized, with a large group of parties still basically oriented toward Moscow, albeit many now more disobedient than before; a smaller group of very important "neutral" states and parties, most if not all of which for reasons of their own agreed with some of the Chinese criticism of Khrushchev's policies; and a very small group of parties and splinter organizations led by Peking disciples. Despite some fluctuations in details, this general picture has not greatly changed since 1963.

As a consequence of these mixed results, the Chinese—like the Soviets—began increasingly to look outside the old Communist movement for additional support, and the Soviets found the arena of competition shifting. In 1963, Peking for the first time began to blur the hitherto sacrosanct distinction between Communist and non-Communist, and publicly promised to anoint as honorary "Marxist-Leninists" all revolutionaries outside the Communist movement who would follow it. (At the same time, leaders of important Communist parties which supported the U.S.S.R. and expelled pro-Chinese factions ceased to be invited to Peking.) By the fall of 1965, the Chinese had also ceased to refer to the "Socialist camp"; by this time, too, the

⁴ See, in this connection, the superb discussion of events in the Soviet leadership at this time in Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin From Khrushchev to Kosygin* (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), Chapters 1-3.

⁵ To the more ideologically-motivated Soviet leaders, these endless reassertions that the U.S.S.R. exists as part of a universal ideological struggle have a function beyond mere lip-service to dogma. They also serve both to reaffirm the legitimacy and necessity of the party's rule at home and to justify continued Soviet efforts to expand the U.S.S.R.'s zone of influence abroad. Khrushchev's retreat on this point in 1960 was therefore doubtless congenial to some of his colleagues.

⁶ The evolution of Soviet relations with the governments of many of these newly independent states—bolstered by Soviet military and economic assistance which Chinese resources could not match—was in fact to give the Soviets a major advantage, in the years to come, in helping to repel Chinese attacks on the U.S.S.R. in the developing world.

(Chinese had publicly announced that they had nothing left in common with the Soviet Union, and during the following spring, they severed party relations with the Soviets by refusing to attend the 23d C.P.S.U. Congress.

By early 1966, the Soviets had thus found that the Chinese had opted out of Stalin's old Communist movement, and had withdrawn from competition with Moscow for the good will of all but a few of the Communist parties and states with which the Soviets themselves had dealings. Thereafter, during the three years of China's Cultural Revolution frenzy from late 1965 through most of 1968, the Chinese went a step further and, through wholesale alienation of other parties and states, in effect defaulted on most meaningful and effective political competition of any kind with the U.S.S.R. Thus, while non-Communist governments were affronted by actions such as the attacks on foreign embassies in Peking, even Communist parties and regimes formerly sympathetic to the Chinese and critical of the Soviets were now estranged by the dogmatic insistence of Mao's cult and on total obedience to all Chinese wishes now practiced by the Chinese Communist party. In this situation, the Soviets were able to resume the polemical attacks on Mao which they had muted after Khrushchev's fall; and while the Soviets were clearly alarmed at the seeming irrationality and unpredictability of such Chinese actions as the January, 1967, siege of the Soviet embassy, Moscow nevertheless was doubtless gratified at the easy political target Peking now presented.

MOSCOW AND THE NEW CHINESE CHALLENGE

Beginning in 1968, however, when the Chinese began to emerge into the real world from their Cultural Revolution self-isolation, the Soviets found that they had a very different competitor. Four years later, the Soviet leaders may have come to realize that they themselves have provided a major stimulus for the growth of this more sober outlook in Peking. For the military actions taken by the U.S.S.R. in two successive years—first, in 1968, in Czechoslovakia, and then, in 1969, along the Chinese border—certainly must have convinced the Chinese leadership that the Soviet Union represented a concrete threat suffi-

ciently grave to require an end to internal anarchy and external fantasy.

Since 1968–1969, thus, the Soviets have watched the Chinese reach out to the rest of the world in search of visible political bulwarks against Soviet pressure. The Chinese have improved their relations with North Korea, have recultivated Rumania, have made amends to foreigners who had been harassed during the Cultural Revolution, and have considerably increased Chinese economic aid to selected states of Asia and Africa. Particularly significant has been Chinese readiness to “normalize” state relations with Yugoslavia and to cease hurling vitriol at Yugoslav President Tito after so many years of bitter ideological polemics. The Soviets have reacted to Chinese moves in East Europe primarily in terms of the threat they saw posed to their interests by Chinese intrigues there; and the Soviet and East European press have alluded on occasion to the alleged menace of a Rumanian-Yugoslav-Albanian bloc encouraged by Peking. But more fundamental, in the Chinese change regarding Yugoslavia, has been the evidence that the Chinese are now willing to subordinate great ideological differences for the sake of improving relations with a country which is also resisting Soviet power.

The culmination of this more pragmatic Chinese trend, of course, has been the reduction of Chinese tensions with the United States. Peking has now come full turn since its attacks on Khrushchev for his attempts at rapprochement with the United States in 1959–1960, but Soviet leaders naturally can derive little satisfaction from this belated vindication of Khrushchev's policy example.⁷ For accompanying this historic development in Sino-American relations have come a series of changes which Moscow's leaders may consider disadvantageous to Soviet state interests: i.e., Chinese entry into the United Nations, where the Chinese immediately used the U.N. forum for bitter attacks against Moscow on a wide range of issues; Peking's establishment of diplomatic presence in a host of additional countries around the world; and the promise of a gradually widening, competitive Chinese presence at innumerable international forums and negotiations where Moscow has long been accustomed to carrying the Marxist-Leninist banner.⁸

The Soviets still seem to be groping for adequate responses to the new and different Chinese challenge. One partial answer has been Moscow's cautious exploration of the concept of an Asian security system,

(Continued on page 185)

⁷ The Soviets have been reluctant to admit the reality of the changes in Chinese policy, with much Soviet propaganda continuing to insist that behind the new facade lurks the old alleged Chinese preference for war and dogmatic adventurism. In May, 1972, however, Central Committee official V. Zagladin acknowledged that the Chinese had “abandoned” their “opposition to peaceful coexistence.” See *New Times* (Moscow), No. 22, May 26, 1972.

⁸ Meanwhile, it is true that Peking has not given up support for those selected armed struggles it still considers politically profitable, but in most cases, the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist splinter parties around the world and their distant revolutionary hopes appear to be regarded by Peking as offering little practical profit to the interests of the Chinese state.

Harry Gelman has written extensively on Soviet and Chinese affairs in *Problems of Communism* and other journals. He has also been a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Research on Communist Affairs, Columbia University.

Writing of the significance of Salt I, this specialist notes that the agreement "symbolizes the formal acceptance by both [the United States and the Soviet Union] . . . of the desirability of a stable mutual deterrence relationship. . . ."

The Soviet Strategic Challenge under Salt I

BY BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH

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ON THE EVENING of May 26, 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a major agreement on strategic arms limitation which Presidential Adviser Henry Kissinger later described as being "without precedent in the nuclear age, indeed in all relevant modern history."¹ The specific accord which Kissinger applauded so warmly (and also played a central role in bringing about) consists of a two-part interim conclusion to nearly three years of intensive strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) between the two superpowers, aimed at arresting and eventually reversing the strategic nuclear arms race.²

The first half of this agreement, a formal treaty requiring approval and ratification by the United States Senate, provides for an open-ended ban against the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's) by both countries beyond two token sites for each. The second half of the package, an informal executive agreement between President Richard Nixon and Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, comprises a five-year quantitative freeze on the deployment of strategic offensive missiles by each country at the level of

those presently in place or already under active construction. The two accords, which have collectively come to be called SALT I in the United States, provide both a significant curtailment of the arms competition which has dominated Soviet-American relations in recent years and a promising point of departure for the SALT II negotiations which are scheduled to resume in October, 1972.³ While it remains to be seen whether Kissinger was entirely justified in the fullness of his enthusiasm for the accords, there is no question that the conclusion of SALT I constitutes a major watershed in the evolution of the East-West strategic confrontation. Aside from representing the first instance in which either superpower has shown a willingness to observe significant self-restraint in the deployment of front-line strategic weaponry, it symbolizes the formal acceptance by both countries of the desirability of a stable mutual deterrence relationship and the apparent contentment of each, at least for the moment, to live with rough (if not precise) strategic equivalency to one another rather than to continue a costly and profitless arms race.

AMERICAN OPINION

As one might well expect of such a trail-blazing agreement, however, SALT I has succeeded not only in winning the widespread acceptance and approval of the centrist majority but also in arousing considerable dissatisfaction on both ends of the American political spectrum. On the one hand, there is the liberal objection that because SALT I fails to prevent such qualitative weapons innovations as the supersonic B-1 bomber, the new Trident missile-launching submarine, the underwater long-range missile system (ULMS), and multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's), the agreement not only fails to go far enough but indeed does so little as to be scarcely more than cosmetic in ultimate effect.⁴ On

¹ Remarks at a congressional briefing, June 15, 1972, in *Documentation on the Strategic Arms Limitations Agreements* (Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, News Release, June 20, 1972).

² A brief historical overview of the SALT negotiations may be found in Bernard Gwertzman, "Strategic Arms Talks: Long Road to Success," *The New York Times*, June 18, 1972. On Soviet motivations and objectives in the talks, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Moscow and the Missile Race," *Current History*, Vol. 61 (October, 1971), pp. 215-221, and Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Interests in SALT: Political, Economic, Bureaucratic, and Strategic Contributions and Impediments to Arms Control* (The RAND Corporation, P-4702, September, 1971).

³ For the full range of specifics, see the SALT texts in this issue, pp. 181ff.

⁴ See, for example, Bernard T. Feld, "Looking to SALT II," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 28, No. 6 (June, 1972), pp. 2-3.

the other hand, there is the conservative argument that because SALT I formally concedes to the Soviet Union a significant measure of ascendancy over the United States both in overall numbers of offensive missiles and in the combined throw-weight, or payload capacity, of its land-based ICBM launchers, the agreement consigns the United States to a distinct "second-rate" position in the superpower relationship. The conservatives fear that this might eventually oblige Washington to back down under the weight of nuclear blackmail in any future crisis with the Soviet Union.⁵

The liberal objection, while fair enough as a statement of general principle, is of relatively marginal consequence to the immediate success of SALT I both because its adherents do not oppose the accord *per se* and because, in any event, there is no absolute certainty that the new weapons which they do oppose will in fact be produced and deployed by the United States. Three of them, indeed (B-1, Trident, and ULMS), are being pushed explicitly by the Nixon administration as much for bargaining chips in SALT II as for actual follow-on strategic forces. Even if SALT II fails to provide an agreement which obviates the need for their deployment, moreover, it is far from clear at this point that Congress will abide by the administration's request for their full funding.⁶ The conservative argument, on the other hand, deserves somewhat more considered attention and analysis because its proponents (largely within Congress and in the Department of Defense) are in a position and frame of mind to exert great efforts toward torpedoing the prospects for SALT I's success if the inequities and dangers which they perceive in the agreement are not satisfactorily explained away or accommodated.

THE CONSERVATIVE ARGUMENT

In the discussion that follows, therefore, we shall examine the Soviet-American strategic weapons lineup which the SALT I accords envisage with a view toward clarifying and placing in perspective the following issues raised by the conservative argument: (a) the nature of the asymmetries which the treaty allows between the United States and the Soviet

Union; (b) the extent to which the Soviet numerical edge in offensive missile strength and in ICBM throw-weight undercuts American deterrent and political bargaining capabilities; and (c) the propriety and advisability of American acceptance of SALT I given the quantitative and qualitative imbalances which the accord promises to ratify in favor of the Soviet Union.

THE TERMS OF THE SALT I

By far the most significant accomplishment of SALT I is its formal treaty provision which sharply circumscribes each superpower's latitude to deploy ABM defenses. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union are both limited to two ABM sites consisting of no more than 100 interceptors each, with one allocated to the defense of each country's National Command Authority (NCA) in the respective capital cities of Washington and Moscow, and the other co-located with an ICBM complex no closer to the capital city than 1,300 kilometers (the distance provision being to assure that neither side might surreptitiously seek eventually to link the two ABM sites into a limited "area defense" system protecting a larger part of the country than that permitted by the treaty). The ABM agreement also places stringent limitations on supporting radar capabilities and on various sorts of hardware development and testing procedures to assure that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union may upgrade its extensive air defense missile force to ballistic missile intercept potential.

In effect, the ABM portion of SALT I essentially provides for a formal ratification of the prevailing *status quo*. The United States is allowed to keep its ABM site now under construction at Grand Forks, North Dakota; the Soviet Union is similarly allowed to retain its Moscow ABM network which has been operational since 1967; and, to redress the asymmetry, each country is allowed one additional ABM complex of the type which it lacks and the other side has. (In the Soviet case, this means one ICBM hard-point defense complex east of the Urals, and in the American case, an ABM defense of the Washington NCA.)

It would, of course, be simple for a skeptic to protest that in submitting to the ABM limitation agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union may well have done little more than reveal that they could be equally sanctimonious in formally pledging themselves not to do something they probably would have preferred not to do in any event. Certainly the Soviet Union has never expressed any serious public interest in deploying extensive ABM defenses around its land-based ICBM force, and there is considerable presumptive evidence that during the course of SALT I (if not indeed prior to it), the Soviet leadership also gradually lost whatever fascination it may once have

⁵ The leading public proponent of this viewpoint is Senator Henry Jackson, closely followed by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird. For general background, see "Second Thoughts on SALT I," *Time*, July 10, 1972. For a detailed and sophisticated articulation of the conservative argument by a highly knowledgeable civilian defense intellectual, see also Donald G. Brennan, "When the SALT Hit the Fan," *National Review*, June 23, 1972.

⁶ A Princeton University study group has suggested that the proposed fleet of 241 B-1 strategic bombers, for example, when coupled with SRAM (Short-Range Attack Missile) armament and a supporting fleet of new tanker aircraft, could run as high as \$75 billion, as contrasted with the \$11.1 billion price tag put on it by the administration. See Peter J. Ognibene, "The B-1 Ballyhoo," *The New Republic*, June 17, 1972.

had with city defenses of the Moscow ABM variety.⁷

In the United States, likewise, it has never been altogether clear how committed toward a massive ABM system the Nixon administration would be in the absence of a SALT treaty, if not because of lingering doubts about the technical efficacy of such a system against a determined offense, then certainly because of the serious question, whether Congress could be persuaded to authorize the vast financial resources its deployment would require. It would hardly follow from such an argument, however, that the ABM portion of SALT I is mere diplomatic window-dressing. The specter of an effective defense against ballistic missile attack has long been one of the most acute sources of instability in the East-West strategic relationship, because of the finite possibility that the eventual possessor of such a defense could come to find a first-strike posture feasible and thereby nullify the deterrent capacity of his adversary's nuclear retaliatory forces.

As a result, the ABM specter has been one of the principal forces energizing the quantitative race for strategic offensive force supremacy between the two superpowers. It was in part the perceived threat of an eventual Soviet ABM capability, for example, which inspired the initial development of MIRV by the United States in the early 1960's as a means of

providing individual American ICBM's with enough separate warheads to assure that at least one of them could penetrate a concerted ABM barrage.⁸ With the SALT I prohibition against significant ABM deployment by either superpower, this vicious circle of offense-defense interaction has been deprived of much of its former perniciousness. With the first-strike threat thereby substantially defused, both sides can accordingly feel far less concerned about the need to maximize the size of their offensive forces. For this reason alone, the ABM accord represents a signal advance in the effort to bring the nuclear arms race under control.⁹

THE INFORMAL AGREEMENT

It is not so much the formal ABM treaty as it is the offensive weapons bargain consummated in the informal SALT I executive agreement, however, that primarily raises the hackles of President Nixon's conservative opposition on the arms control issue. According to the terms of the agreement, each country is obliged to refrain for a five-year period from fielding any strategic offensive forces other than those already deployed or under construction. Furthermore, each country is allowed—if it so chooses—to replace its more obsolescent land-based ICBM's (in the Soviet case, 200 SS-7's and SS-8's, and in the American case, 54 Titan II's) with an equivalent number of advanced submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's). The problem with this formula in the eyes of the critics is that it formally concedes to the Soviets both a sizable quantitative lead in overall numbers of offensive missiles and a marked advantage in the throw-weight of its land-based ICBM force.¹⁰ In the ICBM category, the agreement allows the Soviet Union approximately 1,600 launch vehicles (of which around 280 are of the heavy-payload SS-9 variety) to 1,054 for the United States. In the SLBM category it allows the Soviets a proportionally similar numerical advantage of up to 950 launchers, as compared with 710 for the United States.¹¹ In terms of ICBM throw-weight, finally, it allows the Soviets an edge by a factor of from 2.5 to 4 depending on which subjective calculation criteria one prefers to employ. Reduced to practical language, this suggests that if the Soviets were to MIRV their ICBM force (a move not proscribed by the executive agreement), they could potentially attain as much as a 4 to 1 superiority over the United States in numbers of deliverable nuclear warheads of equivalent size and yield.

Granted that the interim agreement confers these quantitative advantages on the Soviets, however, the relevant question is not simply whether Moscow can be said to have attained a measure of "superiority" out of the deal, but whether that superiority is meaningful in any practical sense. And on this latter score, for a variety of strategic and technical reasons,

⁷ The Moscow ABM complex is estimated to consist of relatively primitive exoatmospheric interceptors and low-performance radars as compared with the technically more elegant American Safeguard system. Deployment of the Moscow system terminated in the late 1960's at 64 launchers, at about the same time that commentary began appearing in the Soviet military press deprecating the reliability of ABM's against a sophisticated attack. It may well be, therefore, that the Soviets simply found themselves stuck with a losing proposition and happily chose to cut their losses in SALT rather than press ahead with further deployments that would merely have wasted a lot of money.

⁸ There was also a counterforce target-coverage rationale underlying the initial MIRV concept. Whether that rationale or the ABM-penetration argument was the one primarily responsible for getting the MIRV program under way is not altogether clear from the available evidence. See James R. Kurth, "A Widening Gyre: The Logic of American Weapons Procurement," *Public Policy*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer, 1971), pp. 383-385.

⁹ It does not, however, totally eliminate the offense-defense interaction dynamic. Research and development in high-energy lasers and in other ballistic missile defense schemes not based on missile interceptors are in no way affected by the ABM treaty.

¹⁰ Throw-weight, usually measured in kilopounds or fractions thereof, is a term used to denote the effective payload of an offensive missile. Its importance in strategic force calculations stems from the fact that it is more or less directly correlated with a missile's overall megatonnage capacity or number of deliverable independent warheads of equivalent size. As a general rule, the more throw-weight increases, the more versatile a missile becomes.

¹¹ These and other figures cited in this article are taken from a Defense Department release published in *The Washington Post*, May 27, 1972. For a comprehensive run-down of Soviet and American strategic capabilities, see *The Military Balance, 1971-1972* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972). See also the excellent analysis presented in Johan Jorgen Holst, *Comparative U.S. and Soviet Deployments, Doctrines, and Arms Limitation* (Chicago: Center for Policy Study, University of Chicago, 1971).

there is a strong answer to be made in the negative.

SALT I AND THE SOVIET THREAT

To begin with, the numerical ratio of offensive missiles in the Soviet-American strategic equation is only part of the overall picture and can be quite misleading if interpreted *in vacuo*. While the provisions of SALT I allow the Soviets theoretically a substantial quantitative lead over the United States in offensive launch vehicle strength, that putative advantage is offset by a more than two-to-one American counter-preponderance over the Soviet Union in the more significant category of individual nuclear warheads and bombs deliverable to independent targets. Including SLBM and manned bomber delivery vehicles as well as ICBM's, the figures top out at approximately 5,700 warheads for the United States as opposed to 2,500 for the Soviet Union, the difference being a product of the United States' monopoly on operational MIRV's and its substantial numerical superiority over the Soviets in manned strategic bombers. If one also includes the more than 400 nuclear-capable American forward-based tactical fighter aircraft in Europe and aboard carriers in the Mediterranean, the imbalance becomes weighted even more in favor of the United States.

Second, the quantitative missile supremacy granted to the Soviets by SALT I is far more potential than real at the moment. The Soviet SS-9 heavy-booster deployment program, for example, ground to a halt at around the 280-mark in 1970, leaving a force posture considerably short of the level which would be needed to threaten a disarming attack against the American Minuteman arsenal. To be sure, the interim agreement does permit each country to increase the linear dimensions of its ICBM silos by as much as 15 per cent, and there has been some concern expressed in various conservative circles that the Soviets may be in the process of taking advantage of that provision by procuring an entirely new ICBM

even larger than the SS-9 and then deploying it extensively in upgraded versions of existing launch silos.

As best as one can gather from the publicly available evidence, however, that supposedly "new" missile has yet to be seen, let alone identified, by the United States intelligence community. Moreover, the notion that the Soviets would go to the inordinate trouble and expense of tearing down and then rebuilding all their SS-9 silos to accommodate a costly new missile offering scarcely more than a marginal increase in payload reflects, at the very least, a vast underestimation of the Soviet military-bureaucratic commitment to the retention of the SS-9 force which took such painstaking efforts to develop and deploy.¹²

The same can be said of the related concern about the ostensible Soviet advantage over the United States in ICBM throw-weight. By itself, missile throw-weight capacity is a meaningless asset. In order for it to be translated into an instrument for hurting an adversary like the United States who possesses a large and well-hardened nuclear retaliatory force, it must be coupled with enough accurate MIRV's to provide both a highly favorable warhead-to-target exchange ratio and a uniformly reliable hard-target kill capability for the attacker. Yet the Soviet Union to date has not even flight-tested, let alone begun to deploy, MIRV's, and it is thus highly improbable that it could take significant advantage of its ICBM throw-weight superiority during the five-year course of the SALT I executive agreement even if it wanted to.¹³

In the SLBM category, the imbalance granted to Moscow by the executive agreement is entirely problematical because the Soviet Union at present has substantially fewer missile-launching submarines than the United States and will indeed only outnumber us by two (43 to 41) when its on-going Y-class submarine construction program is completed. As noted above, of course, the SALT I accord also allows the Soviet Union (as well as the United States) to replace its early-generation ICBM's with up-to-date SLBM's, a provision which, if implemented by Moscow, would succeed in bringing the Soviet missile-launching submarine force up to a ceiling of 62, or around 20 more than the number available to the United States. Even that numerical edge, however, would be largely illusory because it would have to be accompanied by an offsetting reduction of the Soviet ICBM force from 1,600 to 1,400 boosters. Furthermore, apart from the ICBM tradeoff it would involve, a Soviet decision to go for the full 62-submarine complement allowed by the agreement would still provide Moscow with only a functional equivalency in SLBM strength with the United States, because of the fact that geographical differences and the Soviet lack of overseas submarine bases require that the Soviet Union have at least three submarines for every two possessed by the United States in order to keep an

¹² For a careful analysis which suggests that Soviet weapons deployment policies, like our own, are governed by considerable bureaucratic inertia and are less than readily susceptible to hairpin turns of this sort, see Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, *The Politics of Power: Soviet Decisionmaking for Defense* (Institute for Defense Analyses, P-774, October, 1971).

¹³ This is not to suggest that there will be no Soviet MIRVing at all throughout the span of the agreement. It is, however, to argue clearly that any such effort will not be able to offer the Soviets anything even approaching a credible counterforce capability against the United States. There is a rather hysterical view currently in circulation, perhaps best exemplified in Joseph Alsop's latest strategic disquisition, "The Arms Agreement," *The Washington Post*, May 31, 1972, which seems to believe that all the Soviets need to do to achieve a combat-ready MIRV for their SS-9 force is simply to snap their fingers. In fact, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that the Soviets have had a great deal of difficulty with their MIRV development program and may even have been forced to go back to the drawing board. For the most recent official disclaimer of any rampant Soviet MIRV threat, see "Soviet Test of MIRV is Denied," *The Washington Post*, June 10, 1972.

equal number on station and ready to fire in the event of war.¹⁴

Nothing in the preceding discussion has been intended in any way to suggest that the SALT I accord (or at least that portion of it concerning offensive forces) is the best that the United States could have hoped for. One can legitimately share the liberal objection, for example, against waxing overly enthusiastic about a purported "arms control" agreement which not only fails to block such qualitative weapons innovations as MIRV, ULMS, and B-1, but which indeed does its very best to assure that the American defense budget will become even more astronomical in size than ever before. More important, one can also reasonably lament the fact that the executive agreement did not hold out for something more closely approximating Soviet-American numerical equality in offensive missile strength. A strategic arms control accord, ideally, ought to be structured in such a way as to have a dampening effect on the nuclear arms race by providing for a mutually satisfactory and equitable balance in which neither side need have any reason to consider itself penalized by the embarrassing and psychologically burdensome onus of perceived "inferiority" to its adversary. To the extent that the SALT I executive agreement has led many Americans to believe that

the United States came out of the negotiations on the short end of the bargain and to insist, accordingly, on compensation in the form of unilateral American weapons improvements on the qualitative front, it has failed to live up fully to that ideal objective.¹⁵

THE CASE FOR SALT I

Notwithstanding these technical reservations, however, the SALT I accord comes across on balance as a clearly remarkable and unassailable diplomatic breakthrough which deserves all the support it can get. If it does not offer both sides the best of all possible worlds (as no agreement could be expected to do anyway), it certainly advances the Soviet-American strategic relationship significantly closer to a mature and productive dialogue. For one thing, it has had the unprecedented effect of forcing military leaders in both countries finally to recognize and accept the notion that arms control negotiation is a legitimate and proper business for nation-states to be involved in. For another, it has been a clear testament to the Soviet Union's willingness to be a tractable negotiating partner as long as the United States gives it the respect due an equal and offers reciprocal concessions as well. Finally, and most significantly, it has provided both a notable partial limitation of the arms race by effectively freezing Soviet and American ABM and offensive missile deployments at approximately their current levels and a sound point of departure for the achievement of additional arms curbs in SALT II, such as offensive force-level reductions and selected bans on qualitative weapons innovations.¹⁶

The belief will persist in many conservative circles, however, that the United States "lost" SALT I because of the offensive force superiority which the accord in effect granted to the Soviet Union. Those of this persuasion will assert that the Soviet elite has long been committed to attaining strategic superiority over the United States, that SALT I virtually delivered it to them free of charge on a silver platter, and that in any future international crisis, the Soviets will be able to capitalize on their supremacy by forcing the Americans to back away just as we capitalized when the odds were reversed during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Already, such observers argue, the Soviets have shown a marked proclivity toward diplomatic muscle-flexing as a result of their steady strategic force improvements over the past half-decade, and it should only stand to reason, therefore, that they will continue to do so even more assertively in a SALT I environment which freezes the strategic balance to the distinct numerical advantage of the Soviet Union.¹⁷

"STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY"

To deal with this argument properly would require

¹⁴ It is probable, though not publicly confirmed, that the Soviets attempted in 1970 to establish a missile-submarine support facility in Cienfuegos, Cuba, and were compelled to scuttle their plan in the face of a quiet but firm American reminder that the understanding worked out during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis prohibited such a base. Whether or not the Soviets will make a similar effort elsewhere in the future remains an open question. For discussion, see George Quester, "Missiles in Cuba, 1970," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April, 1971), pp. 493-506.

¹⁵ One is tempted to suggest that President Nixon, in his overweening desire to conclude a SALT agreement during his visit to Moscow for domestic political purposes, settled for a bill of sale that he clearly would not have accepted under less demanding circumstances, and that he could have perhaps easily induced the Soviets to back down from their ceiling of 62 SLBM submarines had he ignored his parochial political interests and allowed the negotiations to continue for several more months. This view, however, must be offset against the equally persuasive comment by a senior government official to the effect that "the President is still a hawk, and anyone who thinks he'd make a deal not in the country's interest for a short-term gain is just damned silly and superficial." Quoted in Michael Getler, "Defense Convinced U.S. Won't Be Hurt," *The Washington Post*, May 27, 1972.

¹⁶ For a useful discussion of the key issues which the next round of SALT will have to face, see Herbert Scoville, Jr., "Beyond SALT One," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (April, 1972), pp. 488-500.

¹⁷ This argument tends to be made more often by assertion than by analysis. For a representative example, see the article by Walter Darnell Jacobs, "Soviet Strategic Effectiveness," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1972), pp. 60-72, which bemoans the Soviet Union's incipient attainment of strategic superiority over the U.S., yet which fails to offer even a pretense of explaining how Moscow might be able to use that superiority to its advantage. For a vastly more sophisticated (though only slightly more substantiated) variant of the same point of view, see Uri Ra'anani, *The Changing American-Soviet Strategic Balance: Some Political Implications* (Committee on Government Operations, Senate, 92d Congress, 2d Session, 1972).

another essay altogether, but the present analysis would not be complete without a few brief remarks in response. First of all, given the multiplicity of criteria which can be used for measuring relative strategic power today, the concept of strategic superiority itself is highly subjective and is very much a matter of idiosyncratic definition. Just as an American observer can conveniently view as evidence of "superiority" the Soviet lead in offensive missile numbers and throw-weight capacity, so a Soviet analyst can equally see in the American preponderance in manned bombers and MIRV's an indication that the United States still holds most of the strategic cards.¹⁸ So it is not at all clear precisely to what extent the Soviet Union really enjoys strategic superiority. For that matter, it is not clear whether the concept of strategic superiority even possesses any practical meaning at all.

Second, it is far from self-evident that the Soviet Union harbors any official doctrinal imperative aimed at the achievement of "strategic superiority" over the United States, however it may be defined. Of course, one can easily find any number of exhortations in the Soviet military literature urging strategic superiority as a policy goal, but such statements are inextricably bound up in internal Soviet bureaucratic in-fighting over resource allocations and hardly constitute authoritative expressions of official government policy.¹⁹ A much closer approximation of the formal Soviet position on the issue may be found in Secretary Brezhnev's insistence that the Soviet Union share "equal security" with the United States, a declaratory perspective which seems far more analogous to President Nixon's own policy criterion of "strategic

sufficiency" than to any sort of doctrine aimed at clear-cut "strategic superiority."²⁰

Finally, the argument that American reticence in the face of Moscow's recent global military demonstrations and intrusions stems from the United States's loss of its former strategic nuclear ascendancy seems strangely oblivious to the corrosive effect which the war in Indochina, domestic dissent, and the resultant decline in the credibility of the United States government both at home and abroad have had cumulatively on the American capacity and willingness to maintain an interventionist foreign policy.²¹ Given the pervasiveness of the domestic and international tribulations the war has imposed on the American leadership and populace, it is hard to imagine how the United States would have responded differently even if the Soviets had remained markedly inferior in the strategic balance.²²

THE FUTURE

As for the future, one can scarcely venture a confident prediction, but it seems likely enough that the outcome of international crises will continue to be governed by considerations of relative commitment and resolve rather than by simple arithmetic calculations of which side possesses the larger or weightier array of strategic nuclear forces.²³ As long as American defense planners persist in wringing their hands over the supposed "superiority" SALT I has conferred on the Soviets and in lamenting the diplomatic disadvantage it allegedly imposes on the United States, they will assure the continued growth of a self-fulfilling prophecy ill-designed to shore up that American resolve which, in other contexts, they themselves deem so important to the diplomatic stature of the United States.

All the same, however, the world will remain a dangerous place for both superpowers to live, and we may thus continue to rely, if not on the self-assurance of American critics of SALT I, then on the ever-present risk of nuclear escalation and inadvertent war to keep the Soviet Union safely delivered from the temptation to push its luck too far in the crisis arena.

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¹⁸ Indeed, one can speculate that the Soviet Union held out for its offensive force advantage in SALT I precisely to counterbalance the American monopoly on operational MIRV's.

¹⁹ An excellent general discussion on this point may be found in David Holloway, "Strategic Concepts and Soviet Policy," *Survival*, Vol. 13, No. 11 (November, 1971), pp. 364-369.

²⁰ See the relevant excerpt from Brezhnev's initial statement to this effect (made before a Moscow election meeting on June 11, 1971) reprinted in *Current History*, Vol. 61 (October, 1971), p. 240. For a discussion of President Nixon's concept of "sufficiency," see also Morton H. Halperin, *Defense Strategies for the Seventies* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), pp. 72-86.

²¹ For further discussion, see the balanced analysis in Andrew J. Pierre, "America Down, Russia Up: The Changing Political Role of Military Power," *Foreign Policy*, No. 4 (Fall, 1971), pp. 163-187.

²² For that matter, it is not altogether clear just how much Soviet policy has been affected by the changed strategic balance. If the Soviet leaders have indeed become so impressed with their alleged superiority and so contemptuous of American diplomatic power and resolve, then one may fairly ask why they took both the renewed American bombing of North Vietnam and the mining of Haiphong harbor without so much as lifting a finger.

²³ This point is developed at greater length in Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Deterrence in the MIRV Era," *World Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (January, 1972), pp. 221-242. See also Alexander L. George and others, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).

"In spite of the more cordial relations between the superpowers during 1972 and the signing of the agreements in Moscow, both the Soviet Union and the United States are still engaged in a major conflict for power and influence."

Soviet-American Relations: A Year of Détente?

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DOES THE YEAR 1972 represent a major turning point in Soviet-American relations,* as some journalists implied during President Richard Nixon's week-long visit to the Soviet Union in May, 1972? Are United States-Soviet relations to be characterized by more cooperation and détente than they have been during the past quarter of a century?

Unfortunately, no clear answer can be given to these questions. Although a *Pravda* editorial of May 17, 1972, spoke of the solution of problems between the United States and the Soviet Union on the basis of negotiation and cooperation and stated that an "improvement in Soviet-American relations is possible and desirable," a month later Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was speaking of "an intensification of that [ideological] struggle" with the West.¹ In addition, Soviet condemnations of the United States, muted immediately preceding and during President Nixon's May visit, resumed soon after his departure.

President Nixon's first three and a half years in office have been characterized, in the area of foreign policy, by a high degree of pragmatism and flexibility. The President and his chief foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, have refused to view the outside world in ideological terms, although this might have been expected of a man whose early political career was based largely on his reputation as an unrelenting opponent of communism. President Nixon has ne-

gotiated with the Soviet Union—and with the Chinese People's Republic—in areas where the latter have been willing to negotiate. At the same time, his administration has continued to pursue policies in the Middle East and Southeast Asia that conflict directly with the goals of the Soviet Union.

During 1972, the United States continued its attempt to adjust to its new position in world politics. Since the mid-1960's, the United States has no longer been able to operate from a position of strategic superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, as it had since the outset of the cold war in the late 1940's. The United States position has been increasingly challenged by local nationalist groups, as well as by adherents of several varieties of Marxism-Leninism throughout most of the world. The major areas of concern for the United States in the past few years, however, have continued to be Vietnam, the Middle East, and the general strategic relationship with the Soviet Union and the implication of that relationship for United States security and global interests. At the same time, continuing domestic demands, especially demands for the cessation of United States involvement in Southeast Asia, have placed restrictions on the flexibility of United States policy.

The question of the overall strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States has changed significantly since the early 1960's. No longer does the United States command the superiority in nuclear weapons that it had only a decade ago. In fact, by 1972, the Soviets led in ICBM's by approximately 1,600 to 1,050, although the United States still maintained a two-to-one lead in deliverable nuclear warheads.²

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

One of the most important shifts in United States policy during the past two years has been the attempt

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¹ "Leninskim kursom," *Pravda*, May 17, 1972, p. 1. Brezhnev's comments are cited in *International Herald Tribune*, July 5, 1972, p. 3.

² See the report of an interview with Henry Kissinger in *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 31, 1972, p. 3, *Newsweek* (International Edition), June 12, 1972, p. 33, and pp. 150ff. of this issue of *Current History*.

to modify the United States relationship with mainland China. Given the changed strategic position of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the Nixon administration has attempted to take some advantage of the continuing quarrels between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. To date, however, this new American approach to China has shown few concrete results.

In West Europe, the year 1971-1972 has not been especially propitious for the United States. The financial crisis of the dollar and the major response of the United States government in August, 1971, establishing a 10 per cent surcharge on United States imports, weakened the position of the United States in Europe. The unilateral actions of the United States government on August 15, 1971, were seen by some Europeans as a further indication of the callousness of United States policy and the unwillingness of Americans to take into consideration the interests of Europe. In addition, the Soviets have continued their attempts to wean the West Europeans away from their close ties to the United States.

On the whole, 1971-1972 has witnessed a continuation of the gradual deterioration of United States influence in many parts of the world. However, major attempts have been made by the Nixon administration to stabilize the position of the United States in its overall relationship with the Soviet Union.

During the same period, there has been little change in Soviet foreign policy. The program of expanding the global role of the Soviet Union laid down by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and modified slightly by his successors in the middle 1960's has been carried into the early 1970's. Although ideology plays a role in the formulation of long-range Soviet goals and in influencing the way in which Soviet decision-makers view the outside world, Soviet policy for the most part is the result of domestic and foreign pressures on the Soviet leadership. In the past decade, Soviet foreign policy has attempted to accomplish several goals. Foremost among these has been the assurance of Soviet security and the general improvement of the strategic position of the U.S.S.R. in relation to the United States. In addition, the Soviets have continued in their attempts to improve their political position in relationship to both the United States and China in various areas of the world, especially in the develop-

ing countries and in Western Europe. Finally, they have tried to reach an accommodation with the United States on certain issues that divide the two superpowers.

During 1971-1972 the Soviets have maintained their efforts to retain the dominant position in East Europe and to effect the economic consolidation of the area through the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation. Most important have been the agreements between various East European countries and the U.S.S.R. for coordination of five-year economic plans,³ although plans for the reorganization of the Warsaw Treaty Organization are also apparently aimed, from the Soviet point of view, at improving the organization as an instrument of Soviet control in East Europe.

Soviet relations with West Europe have shown marked improvement during the years since the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Soviet trade with the Western industrialized countries continues to expand as the Soviet leadership seeks to improve the productive capabilities of its economy by the importation of advanced technology. Most important in this area was the signing of a major trade agreement between the U.S.S.R. and West Germany that was worked out on April 7 and signed in Bonn by Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev on July 6, 1972.⁴

Overall, the agreements between the Soviets and the Germans, as well as those concerning Berlin, are part of the Soviet attempt to regularize relationships with the countries of West Europe. As such, they are also related to Soviet efforts to reduce United States involvement and influence in the area. One goal of Soviet policy since at least the mid-1950's has been the destruction of NATO and the separation of the United States from West Europe. The proposal of an all-European security organization, first introduced at a Warsaw Pact meeting in 1966, and the more recent Soviet campaign for a European Security Conference have had this as one of their major purposes.⁵

In the Middle East and South Asia, the U.S.S.R. has improved its position even more. The August, 1971, "defense alliance" between the U.S.S.R. and India and subsequent Soviet support for India and Bangladesh against U.S.-supported Pakistan in December, 1971, greatly increased the role of the Soviet Union relative to that of the United States. Indian-American relations continue to be strained, while the Soviets are viewed, at least officially, as India's friends and supporters.

In Southeast Asia, the Soviets have been far less successful, although continued American involvement in Indochina prevents the expansion of Chinese influence, thus benefiting the Soviet Union.

Overall, the Soviet leadership has continued to expand the prestige and power of the Soviet state and, in spite of some failures, has taken advantage of crisis

³ The decision to admit Cuba to CMEA, announced on July 11, 1972, should not affect significantly the development of the organization. As reported in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), on July 12, 1972, the particulars of Cuban participation in CMEA are yet to be worked out and the decision appears to be largely a form of political support for Castro's regime.

⁴ See *New Times* (Moscow), no. 16 (1972), p. 3, and *Die Welt* (Berlin), July 3, 1972, p. 1.

⁵ One result of President Nixon's visit to Moscow and the agreements reached between the United States and the Soviet Union during the May summit meetings was the U.S. agreement to participate in a general European Security Conference, but only after long-term preparations had been made.

situations—e.g., in South Asia—to increase its influence. In many ways, the Soviet Union is behaving like the traditional imperialist powers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as it seeks ports for its growing fleet and attempts to undercut the positions of its major rivals.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

During the past quarter century, the United States and the U.S.S.R. have been involved in a series of overlapping conflicts on a variety of levels. These conflicts were originally concentrated primarily along the periphery of the Soviet Union—in East Central Europe, Iran, China and Korea—as Stalin's government attempted to consolidate its power in territories that came under Soviet control at the end of World War II and to expand the areas under Soviet control. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO and other United States military alliances constituted the United States response, and the United States-Soviet confrontation that made history as the cold war was under way.

This conflict, although primarily the result of competition between the two countries for political, economic and military power, was also strongly influenced by a sense of missionary zeal on both sides. In 1947, for example, the Soviet leadership reaffirmed the doctrine of a world divided into two hostile camps. The only possible outcome of the division was a major war that would result in the destruction of capitalism and the final global victory of the Soviet variety of socialism. In the areas under their control the Soviets attempted to enforce ideological conformity in addition to the export of their political and economic systems.

Although the United States response to the Soviet challenge was made primarily in military and economic terms, by the 1950's it had also become heavily ideological as United States leaders spoke of the struggle against a "worldwide Communist movement," the necessity of "rolling back the iron curtain," of preserving "the free world" and of "the immorality of neutralism." Developments within the Soviet empire and in relations between the Communist party of the Soviet Union and other Communist parties that began to erode the degree of control exercised from Moscow went, at first, largely unnoticed.⁶

During the first 10 years of the conflict between the two superpowers, the United States continued to operate from a position of superiority in numerous areas. Militarily, the United States maintained its strategic advantage. In the political realm the U.S.S.R. remained largely isolated from the outside world, and

the United Nations functioned largely as a supporter of United States interests. In spite of the challenges to the United States made by the Soviets in the late 1960's, until the mid-1950's Soviet policy was largely conservative, as the Soviet leadership focused on rebuilding its war-torn society and consolidating its hold on its newly won empire.

Only with the rise to power of Soviet Premier Khrushchev and his reorientation of Soviet foreign policy did the Soviet Union begin to challenge the positions of the United States and West Europe, especially in the former colonial territories of Asia and Africa, but also in Europe itself. The past 15 years have witnessed a major advance of the Soviet position in the world, largely at the expense of British and American influence and interests. Since the middle 1960's, this challenge has actually speeded up, although without the bravado and fanfare that characterized the Khrushchev era.

The major areas of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union can be divided into the following categories: 1. security, in particular strategic military security; 2. the support of allies or client states which bring the two superpowers into conflict with one another; and, 3. the expansion or retention of power throughout the globe. Actually all the areas of United States-Soviet conflict are related to the global struggle for influence and power as a method of assuring one's security—among other reasons. The major geographical regions of the conflict have remained largely the same for the past decade—the Middle East and South Asia, Southeast Asia and Europe.

It would appear, however, that in spite of the history of confrontation and the major unresolved issues that stand in the way of a resolution of the conflicts that remain, progress has been made in several areas. Vietnam, for example, seems no longer to be a major issue in Soviet-United States relations, in spite of Soviet condemnations of United States military operations. The renewed United States bombings in the spring, 1972, did not result in a cancellation of President Richard Nixon's visit to the U.S.S.R., and in early July, 1972, supposedly reliable Communist diplomatic sources indicated that the Soviet Union was counselling Hanoi to accept a negotiated settlement.⁷ In addition, the accord on Berlin signed in June, 1972, reduced some of the causes for friction in another major trouble spot.

The two major areas of conflict between the Soviets and Americans remain the Middle East and the question of a general settlement in Europe that—the Soviets hope—would recognize and guarantee the dominant position of the Soviet Union in the east. Although a settlement of these questions and a resolution of the arms race are not in sight, some progress has

⁶ Obviously, the aid provided to both Yugoslavia and Poland in the 1950's was an indication of a certain degree of recognition that the Communist bloc was not impregnable.

⁷ *International Herald Tribune*, July 7, 1972, p. 1.

been made since both sides have agreed to meaningful negotiations. Many serious differences divide the two countries, yet the threat of nuclear annihilation has forced them to a type of forced détente. Neither country can run the risk of what Samuel Sharp calls "non-co-existence."⁸

THE MOSCOW SUMMIT: THE ROAD TO DÉTENTE?

In the light of cold war history, do the developments of the year 1972 and the agreements reached during the Moscow summit represent a movement toward a negotiated settlement of the major differences between the two superpowers? The May, 1972, meetings in Moscow resulted in treaties concerning co-operation in the areas of ecology, science and medicine, a joint space project by 1976, the cessation of harassment of one another's ships at sea and, most important, an agreement to begin to limit the development of specific types of nuclear weapons.⁹ However, although the last agreement limited certain types of nuclear weapons, others are to be permitted to increase. Henry Kissinger, one of the major architects of the agreements, has noted that this aspect is likely to result in an expansion of nuclear weapons in areas not covered by the agreement.¹⁰

In spite of the more cordial relations between the superpowers during 1972 and the signing of the agreements in Moscow, both the Soviet Union and the United States are still engaged in a major conflict for power and influence. Negotiations have succeeded—and will continue to take place—on questions where both sides see some type of negotiated settlement as preferable to continued conflict. For example, both the United States and the Soviet Union are interested in reducing the burden of military expenditures, at the same time guaranteeing their military security. Neither side wishes the conflicts with regard to specific problem areas of the world to escalate into a direct military confrontation. Both countries seem to recognize the irrationality of large-scale nuclear warfare and are interested, therefore, in containing regional conflicts.

This does not mean, however, that questions such as the Arab-Israeli conflict or the war in Southeast Asia will be resolved by diplomatic negotiations—even

insofar as the United States and the U.S.S.R. have the capability of single-handedly resolving these conflicts. The Soviet Union is still apparently motivated by an urge to expand its influence in various parts of the world. In addition, the Soviet leadership is still formally committed to the goal of a unified Communist world. In the past few years, the Soviets have been willing to use violence in order to achieve these goals, witness Czechoslovakia, in 1968. In the Middle East, they have not only cautioned the Arabs against rash action that might lead to a renewal of military hostilities, but have provided the means for the Arabs to initiate such actions.

The United States, although it is increasingly willing to recognize the Soviet Union as an equal in world affairs and has granted the Soviets the dominant position in various parts of the world, is not willing to permit a wholesale expansion of Soviet influence in areas of interest to the United States. This is especially true in Latin America, where Soviet activity has developed recently.

The coming years are likely to witness a continuation of the policies of the past decade. Both sides will act to limit direct confrontation and the possibility of major war, while at the same time maintaining their own security. They will be willing to negotiate agreements on the control of weapons, but only when such agreements are certain not to endanger their security.¹¹ Both countries will continue to become involved in regional disputes, but they will probably increasingly attempt to control such conflicts.

True détente, however, can only be possible when both sides—particularly the Soviets—are willing to recognize one another's right to exist and to seek to achieve basic interests. As long as either country believes that its welfare can be assured only at the expense of the other—and ultimately only by the destruction of the political and social system of the other country—détente is not possible. Adjustments may be made, compromises accepted, but only for the short term. To date, United States-Soviet relations, although they have improved over the last two decades, are still based primarily on short-term compromise.

⁸ See, for example, Samuel L. Sharp, "The USSR and the West," in John W. Strong, ed., *The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1971), pp. 255–256.

⁹ Since the signing of the treaties in late May, 1972, specific agreements have been signed to begin joint cancer research and to expand United States-Soviet trade. See *International Herald Tribune*, July 5, 1972, p. 3, and July 10, 1972, p. 1. For the text of the strategic arms limitation agreement, see pp. 181ff. of this issue.

¹⁰ Cited in *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 31, 1972, p. 2.

¹¹ For example, the Soviets were unwilling to negotiate meaningful arms controls until they had reached a position of nuclear parity with the United States.

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"... whether the Soviet Union succeeds in denying West Europe as an active ally to the United States . . . depends largely on how responsive West Europeans are to the Soviet diplomacy of détente and whether the United States . . . can continue to sustain its genuine foreign policy interests in the 1970's."

The Diplomacy of Détente: Soviet Efforts in West Europe

BY CHARLES GATI

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ANNIVERSARIES PROVIDE revealing perspectives. Twenty-five years ago this March, responding to Soviet-inspired actions in Greece and Turkey, President Harry S. Truman declared in a speech that was to be known as the Truman Doctrine that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Twenty-five years ago this June, responding to the urgent economic needs of West Europe, Secretary of State George C. Marshall put forth a plan for the economic recovery of that devastated region. And 25 years ago this July, responding to widespread questions about Soviet policies and American objectives, George F. Kennan of the Department of State Policy Planning Staff explained in some detail and with great erudition this country's understanding of the Soviet challenge and our "containment" formula that was to meet that challenge.¹

The year was 1947. Our main concern was the economic and political collapse and the future fate of West Europe. Our new adversary was the Soviet Union, and few if any doubts prevailed about its aggressive designs. The signs were ominous indeed. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, the countries of East and Central Europe had come under Soviet domination. Russian pressures on Greece, Turkey and Iran were troubling, interpreted as clouds foreboding

the coming storm. The Communist parties of West Europe, especially those of France and Italy, were diligently preparing for the day when they could lead their countries towards a Communist future.

Whatever disappointments and failures this country and the West in general have had in these 25 years since 1947, our policies in West Europe must be rated a success. Soviet interest in West Europe has not declined, but the Soviet drive for control of the region and its expectation of a Soviet-oriented Europe have been effectively stifled. For all practical purposes, a Soviet military offensive against West Europe—once a real possibility—can be discarded as a serious Soviet option, and it is so perceived by most West Europeans. To be sure, 2,100,000 NATO troops and 2,300,000 Warsaw Pact troops remain stationed on European soil; yet few expect NATO to face the task of actively defending West Europe or believe that Europe's fate will be decided by armed conflict. Thus, if the struggle for the future of Europe was once conceived primarily in military terms—and it was so conceived 25 years ago—it has since been replaced by peaceful economic competition and complicated diplomatic maneuverings.

Importantly, the very successes of American policy in West Europe, coupled with the region's remarkable economic progress and relative political stability, have impelled the Soviet Union to rely on the non-military instruments of foreign policy in its dealings with West Europe. In addition, Soviet military and diplomatic preoccupation with the Far East, particularly China, is thought to have contributed to a Soviet policy of seeking détente in Europe, a policy that has been strengthened by such West European initiatives as

¹ For the authoritative statement on the doctrine of containment, see George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in *Foreign Affairs*, XXV, No. 4 (July, 1947), pp. 566–82. A more recent reappraisal of containment is given in an "Interview with George F. Kennan," published in *Foreign Policy*, No. 7 (Summer, 1972), pp. 5–21, and in Charles Gati, "X Plus 25: What Containment Meant," also in *Foreign Policy*, No. 7 (Summer, 1972), pp. 22–40.

West Germany's *Ostpolitik*.² Finally, the immense collective strength of West Europe's economy has led Moscow to face the reality of economic regional organizations in the area—that is, to recognize the Common Market (which formally merged with the European Free Trade Association on July 22, 1972) as a single entity.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Because of these circumstances, Soviet diplomacy during the past year or so has focused on three inter-related objectives:

First, the Soviet Union and its East European allies have paved the way for the convening of a European Security Conference, the main purpose of which seems to be the creation of a general atmosphere of détente and accommodation in Europe and the recognition of the postwar European status quo.

Second, the Soviet Union has sought to improve its ties with West Germany—until recently its main adversary in Europe—by the Moscow-Bonn treaty of 1970 and the Berlin agreement of 1971 (both ratified in June, 1972).

Third, under some pressure from East Europe and perhaps from Soviet trading officials, the Soviet leadership has reversed its previous policy of profound hostility to the Common Market and has begun to deal with the nations of the European trade community collectively.

In pursuing these three specific objectives, the Soviet Union has retained its broad, long-term objective: to drive a wedge between the United States and its West European allies.³

As to the first objective, until late 1969, Soviet proposals for a European Security Conference focused on securing stable frontiers for its East European allies based on Soviet gains after World War II, and legitimizing the status quo throughout East and Central Europe. According to the Basic Document of the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of June, 1969, the principal aims of European security could best be obtained by implementing the following program:

² A detailed account of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* is found in Lawrence L. Whetten's *Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations Between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact Countries* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

³ Recent general studies of Soviet foreign policy include Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins Press, 1970); and Vernon V. Aspaturian, *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971). A collection of pertinent readings is found in Erik P. Hoffmann and Fredric J. Fleron, Jr. (eds.), *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971).

⁴ Marshall D. Shulman, "Soviet Proposals for a European Security Conference, 1966-1969," *Studies for a New Central Europe*, Series 2, Nos. 3/4 (1968/69), p. 79.

⁵ "Program of Peace in Action," *Pravda*, September 23, 1971, p. 4, as translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, No. 38, p. 4.

It is imperative to secure the inviolability of existing frontiers in Europe, in particular the frontiers along the Oder-Neisse and the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, and to work for international legal recognition of the German Democratic Republic, for preventing West Germany from securing atomic weapons in any form, for renunciation by the Federal Republic of Germany of her claim to represent the whole of Germany, the recognition of West Berlin as a separate political entity, the recognition that the Munich diktat was invalid from the very outset, and the banning of all neo-Nazi organizations.⁴

In addition to these aims, Soviet foreign policy statements accused the Western nations of hindering the cause of peace and perpetuating the division of Europe into blocs by going ahead with plans to consolidate and strengthen NATO defense efforts. In line with this, Soviet proposals for a European Security Conference had been aimed at weakening the NATO bloc by fostering neutralist tendencies in West Europe and ultimately at reducing United States influence in the affairs of our European allies.

But beginning late in October, 1969, prompted in part by a more conciliatory attitude towards the Soviet Union by West Germany and in part by what was seen as the growing military threat from the Chinese, Soviet diplomatic efforts shifted to a new emphasis on détente and political accommodation with the nations of Europe and especially with what until then had been its most virulent West European enemy, the Federal Republic of Germany. Commenting on the results of the meeting between the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, held in the Crimea in July, 1971, the leading commentator of *Pravda*, Yuri Zhukov, observed:

The second half of the 1960's and the early 1970's have been marked by important changes in Europe in the direction of the relaxation of tensions. . . .

It is clear to every sober-minded person that broad new prospects will open up when these treaties enter into force. Essentially, we are approaching in Europe the boundary between two stages—the post-war stage, which was characterized by the atmosphere of the "cold war" and the arms race, and a new stage, the stage of all-European businesslike cooperation. We can and must act so that everything that belongs to the past will disappear over the horizon and new and different opportunities will open up.⁵

Proposals for the agenda of a European Security Conference elaborated since that time—the Communiqué of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact States in December, 1971, and the latest Warsaw Pact proposals outlined in the Prague "Declaration on Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe" of January, 1972—have encouraged the opening up of new avenues for political cooperation between East and West once the normalization of relations is completed. The Soviet Union has urged the widening of trade and economic ties, industrial

and technical cooperation, and cultural and scientific exchanges among the European states. Concrete cooperative projects in the areas of environment, the exploitation of natural resources and development of industry are now proposed by the Soviet Union as practical measures which can be implemented on an all-European, not a bloc-to-bloc, basis.

Thus, as the old questions concerning the fate of the two Germanies and the status of Berlin begin to yield to mutually satisfactory solution, and the immediate potential for political conflict between East and West over these issues recedes into the background, Soviet proposals for the European Security Conference have begun to show less concern with the old problems of East-West relations resulting from World War II or from the cold war struggle; instead, they deal with more current practical problems which may be solved by mutual agreement and to mutual advantage by the nations of Europe. What has happened, in short, is that the powerful impetus for economic unity in West Europe—evidenced by the entry of Great Britain into the Common Market and by the merger of the two European trade blocs—coupled with a growing sense of European political unity have presented the Soviet Union with new problems and new diplomatic possibilities, and the recent modifications of Soviet proposals have reflected this changed perspective.

THE PRAGUE DECLARATION

The text of the January, 1972, Prague Declaration is illustrative of the way in which postwar issues, which have occupied the attention of the Soviet Union for two and one-half decades, are being superseded by a new Soviet attempt to reorder relations with West Europe. This declaration states that "European security and cooperation require the establishment of a system of obligations which would bar the threat or use of force in relations between states in Europe, give all countries a guarantee of protection against acts of aggression and promote the well-being and prosperity of all nations," and then suggests that relations among European states be based on the following seven general principles:

(1) the inviolability of present frontiers between European states; (2) the non-use of force; (3) peaceful coexistence; (4) good neighborly relations and cooperation in the interests of peace; (5) mutually

beneficial relations between states; (6) disarmament; (7) support for the United Nations.⁶

While such "principles" in themselves offer no assurance that a permanent system of security can be built in Europe, the inclusion in the declaration of a broad category of subjects and concrete proposals for joint East-West action, as well as plans to establish a permanent European body to deal with future problems and projects, do provide an area in which cooperation and interdependence among European states may be further developed. Thus, while the principles of this declaration still focus on one of the most important long-term objectives of Soviet foreign policy—the preservation and formal recognition of the postwar status quo—the body of the document appears to deal with issues of a more practical nature.

Accordingly, the topics outlined for discussion are in good part those on which the nations of West Europe are increasingly focusing their own attention. The Soviet Union is therefore trying to make the European Security Conference relevant to if not an integral part of a rapidly and profoundly changing West Europe. It seeks to deal with the new forces at work on the European continent at a forum in which the Soviet Union and its allies can press for the inclusion of the Eastern bloc into the economic and political life of West Europe. As Brezhnev said at the Polish Party Congress in December, 1971:

A start is being made on the transition of Europe to a new historical phase, one that, we believe, will develop under the sign of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation. The all-European conference on questions of security and cooperation acquires special importance in this turning-point phase.⁷

Whether or not Europe is on the "threshold of a new stage," as Brezhnev dramatically phrased it in March, 1972, at the Soviet Trade Union Conference, will depend to a large degree on how successful the Soviet Union is in refocusing its European foreign policy on issues of concern to the people of West Europe, how well it can dampen the forces working for West European unity by channeling them into "pan-European" organizations arising out of a European Security Conference (in which the Soviet Union would play a major role), and how well it can control its East European allies once inside the open forum of a European Security Conference.⁸

THE BERLIN AGREEMENT

The second set of issues to which the Soviet leadership has so successfully devoted its attention during the past year or so has to do with Berlin and West Germany. The agreements represent an important departure from past policies; the Berlin agreement, in particular, required concessions both from the major powers and from the two Germanies.

Involving intricate maneuverings about substance,

⁶ "Declaration on Peace, Security and Co-Operation in Europe," in United Nations General Assembly and Security Council *Official Records*. Twenty-seventh session, Nos. A/8661 and S/10537.

⁷ Leonid Brezhnev, Speech at the Sixth Congress of the Polish Communist Party, *Prawda*, December 8, 1971, as translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XXIII, No. 49, p. 12.

⁸ For a discussion of divergent East European approaches to West Europe, see William R. Kintner and Wolfgang Klaiber, *Eastern Europe and European Security* (New York: Dunellen, 1971).

protocol and phrasing, the Berlin negotiations took place in three stages: the quadripartite or four-power agreement was signed in the fall of 1971; the two Germanies initialed their accord on transit traffic to and from West Berlin and on visiting and traveling rights of West Berliners to East Germany in December, 1971; and the final, comprehensive four-power protocol was signed in June, 1972. To the extent that the location of Berlin in the heart of East Germany could not, of course, be changed and to the extent that there was no attempt to alter the formal or legal status of Berlin defined during World War II, the new agreements did not necessarily solve the Berlin "problem." Specifically, the agreements reaffirmed the war-time responsibilities of the four powers for Berlin and their rights of access to the city. Conversely, neither West nor East Germany have obtained more responsibility for or authority over their former capital. In this sense, the ultimate resolution of the Berlin "problem" remains on the agenda until concrete steps are taken to bring the two Germanies together in a united or federated state.

On the other hand, and more important, if the agreements are as strictly observed as they have been so far, there will be no future crisis or confrontation in or around Berlin. The reasons for this include the following:

(1) Since 1955, the Soviet Union has given East Germany the right to control the movement of civilians and goods along the routes leading from West Germany to West Berlin; this East German "right" has now been retroceded or abandoned.

(2) Concurrently, the Soviet Union has now reassumed responsibility for unimpeded access to West Berlin.

In exchange for these Soviet (and East German) concessions, the Western powers have agreed (a) to the opening of a Soviet consulate in West Berlin and (b) to a reduction of official West German political activities in West Berlin (i.e., West Germany will hold fewer *Bundestag* or parliamentary committee meetings or hearings in West Berlin).

It seems certain, then, that confrontations like the one resulting from the 1948 Soviet land blockade of West Berlin or the building of the Berlin wall in 1961 will be prevented. It seems somewhat less certain whether additional improvements will accrue from the Berlin agreement—although the prospects are certainly promising. For the time being, East Germany has made the most substantial concession by giving

up her right (acquired in 1955) over the access routes to West Berlin. Yet in the intermediate or long run, East Germany might benefit most from the consequences of the Berlin accord. For, for the first time since her establishment, East Germany is explicitly mentioned in this international agreement (by her official name, the German Democratic Republic), a seemingly minor circumstance which in diplomatic parlance represents a step toward formal recognition of her existence. Indeed, David Binder of *The New York Times*, observing the conclusion of the Berlin accord, reported from Berlin that,

The outcome of today's agreement will be East Germany's entry into the United Nations, simultaneous with that of West Germany, diplomatic recognition of East Germany by the Western allies after 23 years of international boycott, and, finally, normalization of relations between East and West Germany.⁹

This implicit by-product of the Berlin agreement—the immediate elevation and potential recognition of East Germany as a separate state—represents a tangible gain for the Soviet Union. In addition, the signing of the Berlin accord has served the interests of Soviet foreign policy in three respects:

First, the accord was a definite prerequisite to the ratification of the Soviet-West German treaty, initialed in Moscow in August, 1970. That treaty, which lacked the specifics of the accord on Berlin, formally recognized the European status quo and, in particular, West Germany's acceptance of Soviet hegemony over East Europe—and the Soviet leadership was anxious to see it through. However, neither Chancellor Willy Brandt's Social Democratic party nor (especially) the opposition Christian Democrats were prepared to ratify the treaty until an agreement on Berlin could be secured.¹⁰ And, indeed, the West German *Bundestag*'s ratification of the treaty occurred almost simultaneously with the signing of the Berlin accord—thus satisfying the Soviet leadership that even their once ardent adversaries have come to accept the reality of Soviet power in East Europe.

Second, the Berlin accord was also made a definite prerequisite to the holding of the European Security Conference—another major Soviet objective. European members of NATO had specified that they would participate in such a conference only after agreement on Berlin was reached. The United States—invited, with Canada, as a non-European but full participant—had at first shied away from the idea of a conference and then, in November, 1971, eased its stance by stating that once the Berlin accord was final it would favor a special allied meeting to discuss "concrete preparations" for the conference.¹¹

Third, the Berlin accord has raised modest expectations in Europe about the possibility of reaching additional and specific agreements with the Soviet Union. The spirit of détente is beginning to be felt,

⁹ *The New York Times*, June 4, 1972, p. 15.

¹⁰ The political maneuverings surrounding the ratification process were given full coverage in *The New York Times* during the spring of 1972. See especially articles printed on May 2 and May 7, 1972.

¹¹ The United States position was fully outlined by Secretary of State William P. Rogers in a speech in Washington on December 1 (*The New York Times*, December 2, 1971).

and it is precisely this atmosphere which the Soviet Union finds so conducive to its future efforts in West Europe.

As to the third major Soviet objective—improvement of relations with the Common Market—the process of change in Moscow's appreciation for West European integration has been slow and may yet be reversed. It may be that the apparent modification of Moscow's attitude was intended merely to mollify West German opponents of the ratification of the Soviet-West German treaty. It is more likely, however, that the Soviet Union has grudgingly come to reduce its opposition to the Common Market.

The nuances of the new position, such as they are, may best be understood against the background of past hostility. During the late 1950's and much of the 1960's, Soviet and East European leaders objected to the trade barriers established by the Common Market; they also feared the potential political and even the military consequences of economic integration. Although at first they considered the Common Market as a mechanism for dividing the capitalist world market and a reflection of the coming crisis of capitalism, by 1962 they credited the Common Market with "remarkable vitality" and conceded that it led to "increases of wages for the laboring class."¹² Once the success of the Common Market seemed assured, Soviet commentaries raised the specter of an economic union leading to a politically stable and unified West Europe which, if allied with the United States, would continue to represent a military challenge to the Soviet Union. For these reasons, Soviet denunciations of the Common Market were strong and uncompromising.

Since 1971,¹³ Soviet observers have displayed a more realistic appreciation of the Common Market. Main features of the new Soviet view are the following:

(1) The Common Market may not after all assume political or military functions, for such functions were not assigned to it by all member states; only (or mainly) the United States and England envisaged non-economic functions for the Common Market.

(2) So-called "progressive forces" within the Common Market were considered to be on the ascendancy; the result would be a more discriminatory stance toward American multinational corporations and a less discriminatory stance toward COMECON, the Soviet and East European economic grouping.

(3) The remaining major objection, was the fact that the Common Market still discriminated against the Communist countries commercially; however, full

acceptance if not approval of the organization was implied if the forthcoming European Security Conference resulted in equitable trade relations between members of the Common Market and COMECON.

The evolving Soviet position was summed up by Brezhnev, who stated in March, 1972, that,

The U.S.S.R. is far from ignoring the actual existing situation in Western Europe, including the existence of such an economic grouping as the "Common Market." We attentively follow its evolution and its activities. Our relations with its members, naturally, will depend on the extent to which they, on their part, recognize the realities existing in the socialist part of Europe, in particular the interests of COMECON members states. We are for equality in economic relations and against discrimination.¹⁴

What the Soviet Union seeks to accomplish with its new policy toward the Common Market goes to the very heart of its broader objectives toward the West.

By recognizing the legitimacy of the Common Market and exploiting the latter's desire for trade, the Soviet Union was willing to reverse its previous ideological outlook. The price for such reversal or inconsistency was criticism from more dogmatic Communists; indeed, a Chinese attack followed Brezhnev's speech by only a few days.

But Moscow's potential gains will likely include more than access to Western technology, however important that may be. For the more ambitious, though less visible, Soviet goal is political: the Soviet Union has now offered itself—its market, its products, its resources—as an alternative to the United States in Europe. This momentous gambit to divide the West by peaceful and largely economic means is comparable to Moscow's efforts since the 1950's to deny the non-aligned Third World to the West, to neutralize and realign that area. And, despite such setbacks as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's recent decision to send his Soviet military advisers home, Moscow's influence in the Third World has increased, while the West's influence has declined. The outcome of the present effort—whether the Soviet Union succeeds in denying West Europe as an active ally to the United States—depends largely on how responsive West Europeans are to the Soviet diplomacy of détente and whether the United States, under domestic pressure for disengagement, can continue to sustain its genuine foreign policy interests in the 1970's.

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¹² As quoted in Werner Feld, "The Utility of the EEC Experience for Eastern Europe," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, VIII, No. 3 (March, 1970), p. 237.

¹³ For an informative summary and analysis, see Henry Schaefer, "The Eastern Reassessment of the EEC," *Radio Free Europe Research*, May 4, 1972.

¹⁴ *Pravda*, March 21, 1972.

"The Soviet Union may be expected to expand its efforts to encourage a pro-Soviet orientation among the military elites controlling the intensely nationalistic, increasingly xenophobic regimes of the Middle East. However, the establishment of a presence is not synonymous with the exercise of influence; customers are not necessarily clients; and aid does not automatically make permanent friends."

The Soviet Union in the Middle East

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THE SOVIET UNION HAS BECOME a major force in the Middle East. In recent years, especially since the June, 1967, Arab-Israeli war, it has stepped up military and economic commitments and has established a growing presence in most of the leading Arab countries, from Algeria to Iraq. Soviet diplomacy is active, skillful and ambitious. The Soviet navy, now a permanent feature of Mediterranean politics, has a cautionary effect upon the behavior and calculations of the key actors in the area, including the United States, which no longer has its former options for intervention on behalf of beleaguered clients. Notwithstanding the important agreements on strategic weapons and European affairs concluded at the Moscow summit conference in May, 1972, the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East continues unabated—intensive and fraught with danger.

The importance of the Middle East needs no elaboration. Geographically, the Middle East is the land bridge linking Europe to Africa and Asia; strategically, it commands key air routes and maritime communications; economically, it possesses the world's vastest proven reserves of oil; and politically, as a region simultaneously experiencing three revolutions—political, economic and social, it suffers from endemic instability that attracts Great Power involvement.

Moscow's historic interest in the area has been discussed frequently in this journal.¹ It is sufficient to note here that the Soviet Union played only a marginal part in the political developments of the Middle East during the 1917–1955 period with the notable exceptions in 1945–1946 of Stalin's pressure against Turkey and interference in Iran. Moscow's non-involvement was dictated by Soviet internal strife

and priorities elsewhere—in consolidating Soviet imperial rule in East Europe after 1945 and in establishing a sound relationship with Communist China after October, 1949; and by the absence of opportunities for influence-building. However, with the erosion of British and French power, the resistance of the newly independent Arab countries to re-entanglement in Western-dominated alliance systems, and the festering Arab-Israeli dispute, the Soviet Union moved to exploit the region's systemic instability and tension, acting on the age-old principle, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." It supported Egypt, Syria, the Sudan, Iraq (after 1958) and Algeria (after 1962) in order to encourage their anti-Western policies, to undermine the West's once dominant position, and to pave the way for active Soviet involvement in the region.

This essay will seek to identify the principal aims of Moscow's "Forward Policy" in the Middle East; the magnitude and diversity of Soviet efforts; the problems encountered by the Soviet Union; and the dilemmas confronting Soviet policy-makers as they move from success in establishing a major presence to frustration in trying to exercise tangible influence over the actual behavior of their most prominent client states.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

First, the Middle East is an area of strategic importance to Soviet national security. A belt of friendly states on its southern border is not a marginal objective for the U.S.S.R., hence its special efforts at improving relations with Iran and Turkey and weakening their commitment to the Western alliance systems to which they belong (Iran is a member of CENTO; Turkey is a member of CENTO and NATO.) By promoting economic ties and avoiding rocket-rattling, Moscow seeks to induce Iran and Turkey to diminish their military involvement with the West. Since the mid-1960's, this policy has suc-

¹ For example, see Robert G. Wesson, "The Soviet Interest in the Middle East," *Current History*, Vol. 59, No. 350 (October, 1970), pp. 212–219; 242.

ceeded handsomely. Iran has refused to allow United States missile installations on her territory and since 1966 has concluded a series of far-reaching agreements involving deliveries of oil and natural gas to the U.S.S.R. in return for assistance in building a steelworks complex and other industries. Turkey, too, has contracted for a Soviet steel plant. The visit of Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny in April, 1972, symbolized the improving Soviet-Turkish relationship.

The expanded Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean is designed primarily to outflank NATO from the south, thereby weakening the West's military position in Europe and further encouraging the European members to opt for détente on Soviet terms. It also serves to neutralize the United States Sixth Fleet, making less likely any American intervention on behalf of pro-Western elites in the Arab world. At the same time, the Soviet military presence strengthens the position of anti-Western elites, who are less constrained from pursuing radical courses, such as the expropriation of Western oil investments.

Second, as a superpower, the Soviet Union seeks to expand its presence in the entire area. It has the nuclear and technological capability and the political will to maximize its involvement and influence in a strategically important region. Of all the Third World areas, the Middle East holds the greatest interest for the Soviet Union. Whether the expansionist drive is imperial or ideological in motivation, or both, is really beside the point: what is unquestioned is the quest of the Soviet political leadership for a voice in the basic decisions affecting the future of the Middle East.

Third, Moscow wants to forestall any Chinese inroads. The halcyon days of the Sino-Soviet alliance are over. The rift between the two colossi of communism which developed during the rule of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev (1955-1964) continues: the two remain implacable rivals, notwithstanding repeated efforts to normalize relations. Moscow believes that Peking's interest in the Middle East is marginal—since Chinese security is not at stake—and that it is shaped by a desire to embarrass the Soviet Union. The massive Soviet military and economic aid to the key Arab countries, coupled with the latter's dependence on Soviet support in confrontations with the West, make the Chinese task difficult. Moreover, Peking lacks the resources to supplant Moscow. However, China can reinforce the Middle East's already widespread doubts about the totality of Moscow's commitment to the Arabs and can intensify the pressures under which Moscow must operate.

For example, in July, 1971, Peking lauded Sudanese President Jaafar Mohammad Numeiri's suppression of an attempted coup by the pro-Moscow Sudanese Communist party. Although riven by factionalism at the top, the Sudanese Communist party was well

organized and influential among trade union and professional groups; it played an important role after 1967 in moving the Sudan closer to the Soviet bloc. In 1968, Moscow extended to the Sudan \$80 million in credits for military equipment and, subsequently, offered the Sudan smaller amounts of economic aid. There is no evidence that Moscow was behind the abortive Communist coup, which it labeled "adventurist," but its relations with the Sudan have suffered, and the Communist party is outlawed. Recently, Numeiri has cooled toward Egypt, which he considers too close to the U.S.S.R., and has sought to improve relations with the conservative Arab governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. China provided the Sudan with a low-interest \$35-million economic loan in the summer of 1971, when the Sudan broke off relations with the Soviet Union. In early 1972, the Chinese and Albanians were the only Communists invited to attend the first Congress of the Sudanese Arab Socialist Union, the only political party now permitted in the Sudan.

The Chinese have also been active in Yemen since the mid-1960's, and their standing with the government is very good because their technicians work hard and keep out of politics, in contrast to the U.S.S.R.'s advisers, who have a reputation for meddling in army intrigue. They have also established diplomatic ties with a growing number of countries in the area: Libya, Lebanon, Kuwait, Iraq and Ethiopia.

Perhaps nowhere have the Chinese succeeded in sowing more doubt about Moscow's credibility than among the radical "out" groups of Arab politics and among the various Palestinian guerrilla organizations, such as Al Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Democratic Front. Having opened a large embassy in Beirut, the Chinese reportedly are active in financing and encouraging Arab extremists to maintain an intransigent position in the Arab-Israeli dispute. In this way, Peking hopes to belittle Soviet aid, to denigrate Moscow for shying away from a showdown with the United States over the return of Arab territories occupied by Israel after the 1967 war, and to feed the notion taking root in the Arab world that there is Soviet-American collusion at the expense of Arab aspirations. In the volatile political environment of unsteady Arab leaderships, the Chinese capacity for troublemaking should not be underestimated. Indeed, there are indications of an incipient split in the Syrian Communist party leadership, long headed by the staunchly pro-Moscow Khalid Bakdash, in large measure because of differences over the party's attitude toward the Arab-Israeli dispute and the authority of Moscow.

Fourth, the Soviet Union is developing an economic stake in Middle East oil and may decide to become a major oil trader. The Soviet Union and East Europe can absorb a certain amount of Arab oil—the only

really valuable natural resource the Arab countries possess to repay the Soviet Union for assistance. Should Moscow ever extend its influence over Iraq and the Persian Gulf, it would acquire an effective lever for diplomatic negotiations with West Europe and Japan.

More than 70 per cent of Soviet trade with the Third World is with the Middle East and South Asia. The increase in Soviet trade in recent years has been greater with Middle Eastern countries. Egypt is the U.S.S.R.'s most important trading partner in the Middle East, accounting for approximately 25 per cent of the total. Next in importance are Iran, Iraq, Syria, Algeria, Turkey and Lebanon.

In advancing its strategic objectives—to secure its exposed southern border; to further imperial ambitions and undermine the West's traditional hold on the area; to thwart Chinese aspirations; and to acquire economic advantages—the Soviet Union has undertaken a combination of diplomatic, military, economic and cultural activities, which can best be assessed within the context of its foreign policy toward specific countries.

RED STAR ON THE NILE

The post-Stalin Soviet penetration of the Middle East began in Egypt. Western policy in the 1950's placed a premium on creating anti-Soviet military pacts and organizing the newly independent Arab nations into one vast anti-Communist conglomerate. This American penchant for pacts resulted only in polarizing the Arab world, whose priority concerns were not fear of the Soviet Union or internal Communist subversion but rather were nation-building, intra-Arab world intrigues, and hostility to Israel.

In Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian colonel who successfully deposed the corrupt King Farouk and moved to modernize Egypt, Moscow saw an opportunity to leapfrog the Baghdad Pact's northern tier members (Iran, Turkey, and Iraq) and end its isolation from the Middle East mainstream by establishing a close relationship with Egypt. Under the shrewd leadership of Nikita S. Khrushchev, the Soviet Union provided Egypt with arms in September, 1955. Henceforth the arms race accelerated. For Nasser, the arms deal marked the end of the West's monopoly over the region's balance of power and greatly diminished Egypt's vulnerability to Western pressure; it also enhanced Nasser's prestige in the Arab world, then becoming increasingly anti-Western. For Khrushchev, support of Egypt soon gained for the Soviet Union a welcome reception among the leading Arab nations; it brought Moscow into the mainstream of Middle East affairs.

During the late 1950's and early 1960's, the Soviet Union extended to Egypt massive economic assistance, which helped to build the Aswan High Dam, com-

pleted in January, 1971, to expand the Helwan steel complex, and to lay the foundation for Egypt's infant industrialization. This aid, of course, was in addition to considerable military assistance. Moscow and Cairo had their difficulties, but overall the relationship was friendly; it resulted in a Soviet presence in Egypt and facilitated the development of Soviet ties with other Arab countries. Moscow supported Nasser's intervention in Yemen (1962–1967)—Egypt's "Vietnam"—and generally aligned itself with Nasser on matters pertaining to the Middle East. What the Soviet Union received by way of tangible return for its investment would certainly not have satisfied any "accounting" theory of international politics, since there were few instances of concrete dividends accruing to Moscow. And, indeed, some Western analysts believe that one of the reasons underlying Khrushchev's removal in October, 1964, was the Politburo's dissatisfaction with expenditures without visible return.

Egypt's crushing defeat in the June, 1967, Arab-Israeli war proved a boon for Moscow, paving the way for a heavy infusion of Soviet military and economic aid and, more important, of Soviet advisers and military personnel. Cairo's dependence was total: the army and air force had to be reequipped and retrained to handle advanced aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems; the economy required imports of food (only half of Egypt's grain is home grown), industrial materials, and machinery, much of which Moscow financed. The Soviet input into Egypt since June, 1967, is estimated at between \$2 billion and \$4 billion.

In her complete dependence on the Soviet Union for protection against Israeli raids on Cairo and other key urban and industrial centers, Egypt made tangible and significant concessions: naval facilities at Alexandria and Port Said, the assignment of five or six airfields for the exclusive use of Soviet forces, and approval for the construction at Mersa Matruh of a major naval "facility" (the term preferred to "base" by Third World countries since it does not imply surrender of sovereignty or smack of colonial rule), to be used by the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. These concessions, granted to protect Egypt during the rebuilding phase of her military program, richly meet Moscow's need to maintain constant surveillance over the activities of the United States Sixth Fleet, thus somewhat reducing the latter's military and political utility to NATO planners. Egypt has eased up on local Communists (the party remains illegal) as a gesture to Moscow. Indeed, in early 1972, two known Communists were included in the revised Cabinet of Prime Minister Aziz Sidky, an American-educated technocrat who is very much impressed by Soviet industrial organization. Soviet involvement in Egyptian economic affairs is expected to increase. How-

ever, Moscow's primary aim is continued good relations with the Egyptian government, and not a Communist takeover.

A new aspect of the post-June, 1967, Soviet-Egyptian relationship is the introduction of serious strains, stemming from incompatible objectives and the dynamics of Egyptian domestic politics. Moscow re-equipped the Egyptian army, but Cairo complains that it is not being provided with the offensive weaponry necessary to retake the Israeli-held territories; Moscow upholds Egypt's position that "a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can be established only if all the provisions of the November 22, 1967, resolution of the Security Council are fulfilled," but shies away from a commitment to fight in the event that the Egyptians try to force a crossing of the Suez Canal; Moscow provides economic assistance, but Cairo is impatient with the pace of industrialization; the Soviets made the Aswan Dam a reality, but Cairo is dismayed by the silting at the base of the dam and the ecological runoffs.

President Anwar Sadat is beset by mounting pressures from those who want to put an end to the government's policy of "no war, no peace," who want either war or a political settlement and a systematic democratization of Egyptian society; and from those who are uneasy over the spreading Soviet presence and influence. In response to the student riots in December, 1971, on behalf of democratization and a decisive policy toward Israel, Sadat went to Moscow in early February, 1972, to request offensive weaponry, particularly long-range bombers and amphibious craft. He went again in late April, to press his case and to persuade Soviet leaders to exact concessions on the Middle East from United States President Richard Nixon (the Moscow summit conference was held from May 22 to 29). The final communiqué, issued on April 29, 1972, did state that the Arab states "have every justification for using other means . . . to regain the Arab territories captured by Israel," thus implying that Moscow accepted the use of force as legitimate, a position it has heretofore been reluctant to condone.

Sadat stressed this point in his May Day speech in Alexandria. He gave implicit recognition to rising anti-Soviet feeling by chastizing the "defeatists" who initiated "the campaign of sowing doubt against the Soviet Union and on Arab-Soviet relations—the savage campaign to which our country has been recently exposed." Sadat deplored the "recent panic" about Egypt's alleged loss of independence and the growth of Soviet influence, and insisted that the country was "not in anyone's zone of influence."

On May 19, at a meeting of high ranking Egyptian officials and analysts held in the offices of *Al-Ahram*—Egypt's most influential newspaper—there was considerable criticism expressed of the U.S.S.R.'s failure

to adopt a stronger stand in support of the Arab cause. Coming three days before the meeting between Nixon and Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev, the discussions reflected Cairo's growing disappointment over the indefinite freeze of the current crisis and Moscow's unwillingness to interpret the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of May 27, 1971, as calling for active Soviet participation, military as well as diplomatic, in the defeat of Israel.

On July 18, 1972, President Anwar Sadat, in a dramatic demonstration of Egyptian sovereignty and displeasure with the Soviet Union, ordered the removal of Soviet military advisers and personnel from the country. On August 5, *The New York Times* reported that only a few hundred Soviet technical advisers still remained in Egypt. Of course, there were a number of factors in Sadat's decision: the opposition of elements in the Egyptian military establishment to the overbearing attitude of Soviet staff officers; the uneasiness of many of Sadat's supporters among the conservative religious community; and the desire of the leadership to boost Egyptian pride and patriotism on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution, led by Abdel Gamal Nasser. However, the manner in which the announcement was made public showed Sadat's calculated desire to express dissatisfaction with Soviet weapons' deliveries and especially with Moscow's unwillingness to provide the offensive weapons essential to ensure a successful forced crossing of the Suez Canal. Sadat also showed the international community that Egypt is not a Soviet puppet.

Soviet-Egyptian relations remain close, but not out of a common outlook or unity of purpose. Cairo fears that a United States-Soviet "understanding" on the Middle East would leave Egypt's present inferior strategic position essentially unchanged. It also views with suspicion Moscow's recent emphasis on improving bilateral relations with other Arab states, especially Iraq, without keeping Egyptian leaders adequately informed.

THE SOVIET-IRAQI ENTENTE

Ever since the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in July, 1958, Iraq has been ruled by a succession of military cabals. Soviet relations with Iraq have fluctuated between friendship and enmity, and the position of the Iraqi Communist party has served as a weather vane for the diplomatic atmosphere. When Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, Moscow immediately extended economic and military assistance. The first Soviet-Iraqi trade agreement was signed on October 11, 1958. In March, 1959, Moscow agreed to a \$500-million loan. Despite repeated Western fears, Iraq has not become a Soviet satellite.

The present government is controlled by a right-wing group, headed by President (General) Ahmad

Hassan al-Bakr, of the Arab Baath Socialist party, which came to power in July, 1968. With Moscow's apparent blessing, it has sought to terminate the lengthy campaign to subdue the Kurds, a minority of fierce mountain tribes in northern Iraq, led by Mustafa al-Barzani, who seeks autonomy for his people. The Iraqi-Kurdish settlement of March 11, 1970, remains in effect, though uneasily.

The Baathists have drawn closer to the Communist world. They recognized Communist China on June 27, 1971, and accepted a small loan. But it is with the Soviet Union that the main connections are being established. In April, 1971, Iraq negotiated a \$210-million economic credit from the Soviet Union for the construction of a crude oil supply line at the Mosul oil refinery, two hydro-electric stations in northern Iraq, a chemical fertilizer plant, and an oil pipeline. In June, 1971, other economic agreements were signed, including provision for further Soviet development of the rich North Rumaila oil field (note: the South Rumaila field lies across the border in Kuwait). The North Rumaila field was nationalized by the Iraqi government in 1961 and partially turned over to the Soviet Union to develop in December, 1967.

The military-diplomatic relationship between the Soviet Union and Iraq was cemented with the signing of a 15-year treaty of friendship and cooperation on April 9, 1972. Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin flew to Baghdad for the occasion, the first time such an important Soviet political figure had visited Iraq. There are three key provisions: Article 8 calls upon the two parties to "hold immediate contacts to coordinate their positions" in the event of a threat to the peace or security of either party; Article 9, in effect, commits the Soviet Union to continue the military buildup of Iraq; and Article 10 says that Iraq will not join any anti-Soviet alliance system. Aside from the promise of expanded Soviet assistance, Iraq can use the implicit backing of a powerful patron, in the event of war with Iran, her major rival in the region.

Iraqi-Iranian tensions stem mainly from two sources: competing ambitions in the Persian Gulf and disagreement over the Shatt al-Arab River. In December, 1971, when Great Britain withdrew from the Persian Gulf, she allowed Iran to occupy several small unoccupied but strategically important islands that guard the entrance to the Straits of Hormuz at the eastern approach to the Persian Gulf; the islands are also in the vicinity of as yet untapped oil reserves. The Shatt al-Arab River, which is formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, forms the Iraqi-Iranian border for about 60 miles as it flows into the Persian Gulf: at issue is a 1937 decision which gave most of the river to Iraq (except for a three-mile stretch opposite the oil refining center of Abadan), thus making Iran's economic use of the

river impossible. Both countries are vying for supremacy in the region.

The Soviet-Iraqi treaty also provides Iraq with support in her current fight with Western oil companies. On June 1, 1972, Iraq nationalized the Kirkuk oil field of the Iraq Petroleum Company, a consortium owned by British, American, Dutch and French firms. It did so because the consortium refused to accede to the government's demand for a virtual gift of a 20 per cent equity share in the company. The Soviet connection becomes important for Iraq if no satisfactory settlement is reached, because the U.S.S.R. could undertake to refine and market Iraqi oil, thereby circumventing the Western shipping and marketing network.

For Moscow, the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty is important for several reasons: first, it assures Soviet naval vessels of a welcome reception in Iraqi ports and strengthens the Soviet presence in the Persian Gulf; second, Moscow appears to be getting a hand on one of the Middle East's most important oil taps, a development which could have long-term repercussions in Europe; third, the treaty encourages Iraq to expropriate Western firms and further to undermine the economic position and political influence of the Western countries; fourth, it has been accompanied by an easing of pressure on local Communists, who are being permitted and encouraged to cooperate with the Baathist government. Indeed, in May, 1972, two Iraqi Communists were brought into the Cabinet, the first time this has happened since 1958-1963; fifth, it enables the U.S.S.R. to outflank Iran and Turkey and exert additional leverage to ensure good will.

For the first time in its history, the Soviet Union is on the threshold of intimate involvement in Persian Gulf affairs. Should the Soviet-Iraqi trade and economic agreement, signed on June 7, 1972, be fully and promptly implemented, the Soviet stake in the area would increase enormously.

MOSCOW'S "FORWARD STRATEGY"

As a region of residual rivalries and tensions, the Middle East inevitably attracts superpower attention and serves as a cockpit for their global competition. Soviet diplomacy has exploited regional disputes
(Continued on page 185)

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In the Soviet Union, "Conservative policies are likely to continue, featuring stern repression of dissent and caution both in economic development at home and the expansion of national power abroad. . . . The record of the post-Khrushchev years indicates that in any crisis powered by the essential conflict between totalitarian politics and social modernization, the party leadership will turn further to the right."

Party and Society in the Soviet Union

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THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP faced four major general problems in 1964: the decline of Soviet great power prestige, resulting in large part from Premier Nikita Khrushchev's adventurist foreign policy, notably his Cuban missile gamble; the fragmentation of the world Communist system and the hostility of China; the difficulties in Soviet economic development and the effects of the East European economic crisis of the early 1960's; and the challenge of maintaining party control in a maturing totalitarian system—control that appeared somewhat threatened both by the effects of the experimentation of the Khrushchev years and by the increasing functional complexity of the Soviet Union's developing social system.

The pattern of response to these major problems by the post-Khrushchev leadership can be broadly characterized as neo-Stalinist. The restoration without fanfare of Stalin's statue outside the Kremlin wall symbolizes the approach of the current Soviet rulers: a low-key totalitarianism that leaves no doubt concerning the realities of power but avoids confrontation whenever possible. There has been a remarkable consistency in this pragmatic politics of consolidation since 1964 and, despite evidence of internal struggle among the leaders, a virtually unbroken facade of harmony and collective leadership, in striking contrast to both the Stalin and Khrushchev eras. Where violent confrontation has occurred, both internally and externally, the outcomes have tended to confirm the impression of rationally controlled power-seeking. During 1971–1972, however, certain strains within the Soviet system raise questions concerning the continuing viability of the cautious managerial approach that is characteristic of the current Soviet leadership.

Escalation of the campaign against novelist Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn indicates that dissent is a growing

problem for the leadership. Solzhenitsyn was attacked by *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (January, February, and April, 1972) for the publication of his novel *August 1914* by a West German publisher.¹ In the January article, an attempt was made to discredit the Solzhenitsyn family on grounds of its anti-revolutionary social origins; the second and third articles concentrated upon claimed historical inaccuracies in Solzhenitsyn's novel and his alleged pro-German, anti-Russian bias. The April article defended the gains made by Byelorussians under the Communist regime and pointed out the war losses sustained by the Byelorussians at the hands of the Germans, whom Solzhenitsyn was claimed to favor. The appeal to nationalism in these articles is not surprising in view of the increasingly close connection between nationalities problems and dissent related to civil liberties that has become apparent within the past year. This connection can be observed in the continuing tension between the regime and Soviet Jews and in unrest in the Ukraine and Lithuania.

EXPULSION OF DISSIDENTS

The Committee for State Security (KGB) has recently forced Jewish (and in some cases non-Jewish) dissidents to emigrate to Israel in lieu of indefinite imprisonment. Because of discrimination within the Soviet Union, emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel has greatly increased within the past two years. The KGB has used this emigration as a cover for the expulsion of political dissidents, many of whom have no real connection with Zionism or with Israel. The most notable of these cases has been that of Yosif Brodsky, a Leningrad poet and a leader in the movement for the expansion of civil liberties. Brodsky, who spent a year in a labor colony above the Arctic Circle in the 1960's for publication in the underground press (*samizdat*) was forced to emigrate in June, 1972.

The Ukraine has long been a source of trouble for

¹ *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, January 12, p. 13; February 23, p. 13; April 19, p. 13.

the Kremlin; Ukrainian nationalism has apparently not diminished very much after 50 years of repression. Recently, many prominent members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia have become closely identified with the civil liberties movement. The Moscow response has been a predictable crackdown on dissidents. In November, 1970, the historian Valentin Moroz was sentenced to nine years imprisonment and five years in exile. In mid-January, 1972, a wave of arrests of some 40 dissidents in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and elsewhere included such prominent Ukrainian writers as Vyacheslav Chornovil, author of the *Chornovil Papers*, which recounted the illegalities of earlier arrests and trials of Ukrainian dissidents and had been published in the West, and the literary critic Ivan Svitlichny. The house of Ivan Dzhuba, another prominent literary critic, was searched; in March, Dzhuba was expelled from the Writers Union of the Ukraine.² Waves of repression have occurred periodically in the Ukraine since 1965. It thus appears that elimination of the obvious manifestations of political dissent with nationalist overtones in the Ukraine is a continuing important goal for the current leadership. While the regime has certainly not stamped out opposition in the Ukraine, the movement for civil liberties there has been at least temporarily checked by the virtually complete removal of the dissidents' leadership.

Two days of rioting by several thousand youths in the Lithuanian city of Kaunas in mid-May, 1972, pointed to a link between nationalism and the drive for civil liberties in the Baltic area. The rioting was set off by the self-immolation of a 20-year-old Lithuanian Catholic, Roman Kalanta, who apparently committed suicide to protest discrimination against Lithuanian Catholics. Soldiers had to be called in to assist police in suppressing the riot by the young Lithuanians who shouted "Freedom for Lithuania" as they clashed with the security forces. The situation in Lithuania had been simmering since late March, when some 17,000 Lithuanian Catholics signed a petition to the United Nations complaining about discrimination and denial of religious freedom.³

Reports in the Soviet press containing criticisms of party organizational work in Georgia demonstrate that the top party leadership is also dissatisfied with the continuing strength of Georgian nationalism and the maintenance of a high degree of cultural autonomy by the Georgians; party officials in that republic have been sharply criticized for failure properly to inculcate party members and citizens with a "Marxist-

Leninist world-view" and the spirit of "proletarian internationalism."⁴

These developments are rather embarrassing to the leadership in view of repeated claims that the Soviet Union has solved its nationalities problem and that the regime enjoys almost universal consensual support. While the proportion of Soviet citizens directly involved in political dissent remains, of course, small, the problem is growing and can no longer be lightly dismissed by the leadership. The general roundup of dissidents in the Moscow area before President Richard Nixon's May, 1972, visit shows that the leadership is highly sensitive to the threat of negative effects upon the regime's international image posed by overt expressions of discontent. The arrest of historian Pyotr Yakir in late June by the KGB makes it clear that the Kremlin is determined to silence dissent, whatever the cost to its image. Yakir, the most outspoken of Moscow's dissidents, had long enjoyed an unusual degree of protection because his father was General Iona Yakir, who was executed in Stalin's purge of the Red Army and posthumously rehabilitated by Khrushchev. The obvious evolution of Stalinism involved in a move against someone like Yakir no longer deters the leadership.

THE PARTY AND COERCIVE FORCES IN THE SYSTEM

The drive against dissent would appear to give the police a greater functional role in the system than has been the case at any time since 1953. This raises the question of a possible resurgence of police power outside regular institutional channels as in the time of Lavrenti Beria. Since 1953, this power has been checked by a division of police functions among governmental structures in addition to the elimination of certain aspects of the police apparatus. The leading role of the KGB, led by Yury V. Andropov, an alternate member of the Politburo, in the campaign against dissent, may well appear to many in the Soviet system as the harbinger of a return to an undisguised police state. An action by the Collegium of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in the winter of 1971-1972 suggests that certain elements in the system are aware of the dangers in any expansion of KGB power and are prepared to move against it. The Collegium put forward a proposal for a central all-Union authority for the volunteer militia, which numbers nearly seven million members.

There is clearly a competitive situation between Andropov's KGB and the MVD, directed by Nikolai A. Shchelokov; this proposal originating with the MVD is no doubt partially aimed at providing an additional check against the rise of KGB power. From the standpoint of the general policy of the top leadership, such a centralization offers the additional advantage of maximum control of the masses at minimal cost, in terms of both material resources and

² See *Radio Free Europe Research: Communist Area*, no. 1251, January 3, 1972; no. 1267, January 17, 1972; no. 1390, March 3, 1972; no. 1331, March 14, 1972.

³ See Hedrick Smith, "Some Cracks in the Kremlin Wall," *The New York Times*, May 28, 1972, p. E2.

⁴ *Pravda*, March 6, 1972, pp. 1-2.

public relations. The proposal was strongly endorsed by *Izvestia*, indicating support from the governmental apparatus.⁵ What is envisioned is apparently a diffusion of power among four nationally centralized security forces; the KGB, the MVD, the volunteer militia and the Border Guards.

The expansion of externally oriented coercive forces also raises questions concerning the relationship of these forces to the party. The increasing emphasis upon the Warsaw Treaty Organization called for by the Brezhnev Doctrine, the buildup of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, the achievement of nuclear parity with the United States, and the massive deployment of forces against China have all tended to increase the internal influence of the military establishment. The Defense Minister, Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, is the most powerful figure in that position since Marshal G. K. Zhukov in the mid-1950's. However, Grechko's influence appears to be confined to defense and foreign policy. There has not been a military member of the Politburo since Zhukov.

On the other hand, one indication of the increasing importance of coercive forces within the system is the fact that 13.4 per cent of new full members of the party's Central Committee elected in 1971 were drawn from military and police ranks, as compared to 8.5 per cent of the old members; percentages of military and police representation among full members of the Central Committee elected in 1956 and 1966 were 7.5 and 8.2, respectively.⁶ While this increase is impressive and reflects the influence of the coercive structures in the political system as a whole, the effect of this representation upon the internal functioning of the party appears minimal.

The party has apparently largely realized the objective set after the death of Stalin of reestablishing its predominant position in Soviet society and keeping other social structures firmly under its control. The main outlines of the political process in this maturing totalitarian system now appear as follows: institutionalized bargaining between the party and other

structures created by the revolutionary transformation of society; a relationship between the party and the masses, featuring an attempt to build consensus, supplemented by coercion where necessary; and the mobilization of social resources to achieve the regime's goals in great power politics and in economic development. In this process, the party is frequently subjected to contradictory pressures that place considerable strain upon its ability to adjust to changes in the environment. For example, the impressive Soviet military buildup since 1965 has gained the Soviets new respect as a great power but this has been purchased at the price of the continued postponement of consumer satisfaction. While the regime has had some success in controlling the pace of rising expectations among the masses, growing awareness of conditions outside the Communist system has made it necessary to demonstrate movement toward equalization of Soviet living standards with those of the West. In recognition of this need, the 24th Party Congress in 1971 provided for increased consumer allocations in the ninth five year plan.

In line with the decisions of the 24th Party Congress, measures have been taken to give priority in allocations to certain branches of light industry and to improve the quality of consumer goods.⁷ However, the raising of living standards to a level comparable with those in the West requires both a reduction in allocations for military purposes and a marked increase in labor productivity. The recent Soviet attempts to promote normalization of relations with the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany reflect in part this Soviet need for reallocation of resources. But even if all goes well with the American détente, substantial savings on defense cannot be expected within the near future, given established Soviet goals in various parts of the world. Moreover, the record on labor productivity for 1971 suggests that no major breakthrough can be expected during the period covered by the ninth five year plan.⁸ Urgent efforts are being made to assimilate Western techniques in automation and systems analysis⁹ but here the Soviets are still far behind the Western countries. The Soviet experience with regard to the introduction of computers points up the difficulties in playing "catch up" with the United States in certain areas of advanced technology.¹⁰

Soviet living standards are unlikely to change very much relative to those of the West within the next few years. Nevertheless, there has been a steady rise in absolute terms; the average Soviet citizen fares far better in a material sense than he did 10 or 15 years ago. Slow but steady increases in the availability of housing, automobiles, television and other items of consumer demand have made something resembling a Western life style possible for a portion of the citizenry. The party, of course, claims credit for the

⁵ *Izvestia*, January 8, 1972, p. 1.

⁶ Robert H. Donaldson, "The 1971 Soviet Central Committee: An Assessment of the New Elite," *World Politics*, XXIV, no. 3, April, 1972, p. 394.

⁷ Report by A. N. Shelepin to the 15th Congress of Trade Unions, *Trud*, March 21, 1972, pp. 4-8; *Izvestia*, February 9, 1972, p. 1; B. Kravtsov, "Accountability of Everyday Services Officials," *Izvestia*, January 27, 1972, p. 3; A. Fokina, "Advantages for the Factory or the Consumer?" *Izvestia*, February 5, 1972, p. 2; V. Boitsov, "Planning Quality," *Pravda*, March 3, 1972, p. 2.

⁸ *Pravda*, January 23, 1972, p. 1; B. Bratchenko, "Miners' Tradition," *Izvestia*, March 3, 1972, p. 3.

⁹ See N. Znenchenko, "The Science of Management: Plotting a True Course," *Pravda*, February 25, 1972, p. 2.

¹⁰ Bohdan O. Szuprowicz, "East Europe: The Search for Computers," *East Europe*, XXI, 4, April, 1972, pp. 2-6; cf. B. Milner, "Lessons of the Electronics Boom," *Izvestia*, March 18, 1972, p. 4.

improvement in living conditions and has made special efforts to identify itself as the champion of the consumer interest against the incompetence or indifference of other bureaucratic structures in the society. Moreover, the highly developed and effective Soviet system of comprehensive social security tends to reduce the potential of negative political effects involved in unfavorable comparisons of living standards.¹¹

When faced with a choice between guns and butter, the present Soviet leadership is likely to choose guns, as has usually been the case in the past. While rising consumer expectations and the increasing functional complexity of the society make such a choice more difficult now, one advantage of the Kremlin leadership is that the industrial base has expanded greatly over the last 10 years. When the Soviet Union surpassed the United States in coal and steel production for the first time in 1971, this was rightly hailed as one of the major achievements of Soviet society. Although there now appears to be a low payoff for the leadership in projecting an image of a hostile threatening America, the goal of overtaking the United States in various areas set by Khrushchev struck a responsive chord among the populace, and evidence of parity in military power, in diplomacy, and in certain areas of industrial production obviously greatly enhances the prestige of the current leadership.

Rapid industrial development in the Soviet Union has produced some of the same problems as in capitalistic societies and some of the same issues, with a resulting clash in political interests between structures created by that development. Thus the party must adjudicate between conflicting interests and it may be difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile all goals set by the regime. The current Soviet drive against pollution is a case in point. As is true in the United States, the requirements of industrial development and employment of labor conflict with ecological demands. While the Soviet press indicates broad awareness of a growing problem that will soon reach massive proportions, achievement in environmental matters has been slow, halting and generally unimpressive.¹² For example, the pollution of Lake

Baikal has been an issue for years, but the planned clean-up has evidently been largely sabotaged by industrial managers and low-level governmental bureaucrats.

Where no conflict of infrastructural interests is involved, the leadership might be expected to produce the mobilization of society for goal achievement more effectively, as in the case of the widely publicized campaign against alcoholism launched last summer. However, the stiff new regulations against the sale of vodka in most public places and the planned reduction in vodka production¹³ may have negative side-effects. Widespread alcoholism is no doubt symptomatic of the grueling pressures endemic to Soviet society; vodka to a certain extent has served as a safety-valve for certain forms of discontent. While the drive against alcoholism will almost certainly result in some rise in production efficiency, it may serve to accentuate the already barely tolerable psychological pressures upon many Soviet citizens.

In all these matters, the leadership is endeavoring to cope with the increasingly complex problems of a developing industrial society without risking any lessening of political control. Gone are the bold and imaginative, if sometimes nearly disastrous, schemes of Khrushchev; the absence of risk-taking is likely to lead to apathy and boredom, which may be a weapon of political control, too. But the leadership seems concerned to assure that such apathy and boredom are not found in party ranks. Khrushchev's vision of a "state of the entire people" has almost entirely vanished, and has been replaced by an increasingly elitist conception of the relation between party and people.

PARTY ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP

Certain aspects of Lenin's original model of party organization have been strongly emphasized in both the rhetoric and the practice of the current leadership: centralization of authority, a professional elite, rigorous grounding in theory, and concentration upon a political, as opposed to a strictly economic, struggle. There has also been strong emphasis upon the party as bearing a multi-functional responsibility in Soviet society, with the consequent requirement for high levels of efficiency throughout the party organization.¹⁴

The tendency toward an even more pronounced elitist role for the party than heretofore is indicated by the slowing down of increments in party membership. Increases in total membership, full and candidate, averaged about six per cent annually between 1962 and 1966. Between 1966 and 1970, the average annual increase was 3.8 per cent.¹⁵ The tendency to render the CPSU more of a quantitatively measurable elite will be accentuated by the purge of party ranks through means of the exchange of membership cards, to be carried out in 1973 and 1974. This exchange of party cards, approved by the 24th Party Congress

¹¹ See Robert J. Osborn, *Soviet Social Policies: Welfare, Equality, and Community* (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1970), pp. 17-94.

¹² "On Measures to Prevent the Pollution of the Volga and Ural River Basins," *Pravda*, March 17, 1972, p. 1; N. Utkin, "The Mountain Forests Cry for Mercy," *Pravda*, March 18, 1972, p. 3; V. Kovda, "Science and Production: to Control Fertility," *Selskaya Zhizn*, December 5, 1971, pp. 2-3.

¹³ *Pravda*, June 16, 1972, p. 1.

¹⁴ See the editorial, "Creative Force of Leninist Ideas," *Pravda*, January 21, 1972, p. 1.

¹⁵ *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations* (Washington: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 1971), p. 78; David Lane, *Politics and Society in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 516.

in 1971, is designed to weed out "inactive and unreliable" party members. Plans for the exchange were completed in June, 1972, by Ivan V. Kapitonov, the member of the party secretariat in charge of cadres, who will direct the purge.¹⁶

Not only has there been a general slowdown and stabilization in party membership; there has also developed a remarkable stability in the upper echelons of the party. This is reflected strikingly in the composition of the Central Committee. A record number, 139 of the 175 1961 full members, were retained at the 23d Congress in 1966, when total full membership was expanded to 195; 153 of the 235 full members elected at the 24th Congress in 1971 were incumbents.¹⁷

The Politburo also displays a high degree of stability. The 11 full Politburo members elected in 1966 were all retained at the 24th Congress of 1971, when four new full members were added. Of the 26 persons who held rank as full or candidate members of the Politburo or members of the Secretariat between 1966 and 1969, 25 were still in this top ruling circle in the summer of 1972.

This stability at the tops lends superficial credence to Kremlin claims concerning the reality of collective leadership. However, it is clear that a power struggle continues, reflected in changes within the government and party during the past year. These changes indicate that Brezhnev is more fully in control than ever before. First, Gennadi Voronov, a full member of the Politburo, was replaced as Premier of the Russian Republic last year by Mikhail Solomentsev, Party Secretary for Heavy Industry. Then, in May, 1972, Pyotr Shelest, Party Secretary for the Ukraine since 1963 and a full member of the Politburo, was replaced by Vladimir Scherbitsky, a Brezhnev protégé and perhaps the First Secretary's strongest supporter among the full members of the Politburo. Scherbitsky was one of four new full members added to the Politburo at the 24th Party Congress in 1971. All of the others, V. V. Grishin, D. A. Kunaev, and F. D. Kulakov, have also been closely identified with Brezhnev in the past.

The jockeying for power at the top of the party is connected with positions on major issues. Some members of the Politburo, including Premier Aleksei Kosygin and President Nikolai Podgorny, are believed consistently to take positions somewhat more liberal than those of First Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. At the other extreme are the hard-liners who consider Brezhnev's centrist positions too liberal. Shelest, clearly identified with the right wing, is known to

have opposed both the new orientation toward consumer goods and the policy of accommodation with the United States. This, no doubt, was a factor in his ouster but there are indications that Shelest's failure to curb dissent effectively in the Ukraine also contributed heavily to his downfall.

Brezhnev has also moved to secure his influence in certain areas where his control was previously reported to be uncertain, notably in Kazakhstan. The signal honors and unusual praise in the press accorded to D. A. Kunaev, full Politburo member and First Secretary of the Kazakhstan party, on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday last winter, is probably reflective of a clear orientation by Kunaev toward Brezhnev's camp.¹⁸

There has been speculation concerning a probable shakeup in the Politburo. In a reshuffle, Solomentsev is almost certain to move up to full Politburo membership. Such a change would further solidify Brezhnev's power; however, there are still checks upon the First Secretary's complete domination of the party. In addition to Kosygin and Podgorny, Politburo members who retain a large measure of independence from Brezhnev include Andrei Kirilenko and Mikhail Suslov. Alexander Shelepin has long been recognized as an opponent of Brezhnev, but his influence has been steadily declining for several years. The exclusion of Shelepin's close associate, V. Y. Semichastny, from the new Central Committee in 1971 completed the virtual elimination of the "Komsomol" group that had strongly supported the trade union leader. Notably, Shelepin's name appeared last among the old members in Brezhnev's announcement concerning the new Politburo at the 24th Party Congress in 1971. The two members immediately ahead of Shelepin on the list, Shelest and Voronov, have since lost their jobs.

Average age of the Politburo is now almost 62: Brezhnev is 66, Kosygin, 68, and Podgorny, 69. Real innovation is unlikely from this aging leadership, whether or not Brezhnev further consolidates his power. Conservative policies are likely to continue, featuring stern repression of dissent and caution both in economic development at home and the expansion of national power abroad. However, the continuing

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¹⁶ *Pravda*, June 24, 1972, p. 1.

¹⁷ Donaldson, *op. cit.*, p. 394; Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union," in John W. Strong (ed.), *The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971), p. 41.

¹⁸ *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, January 12, 1972, p. 1.

"In the 1970's, the Soviet economy has to produce not just more but more efficiently; it must make better goods more cheaply. In the last analysis, the problem of efficiency . . . concerns the very nature of the economic system."

The Soviet Economy: An Overview

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THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY ECONOMY can be measured by two yardsticks: quantity and quality of output. Quantity of output is almost self-explanatory: the turning out of more goods this year than last. The ability of the Soviet economy to produce volume is not seriously questioned insofar as producer goods are concerned. The supply of consumer goods has lagged behind because a conscious decision had been made to this effect by leaders able to bend consumer resistance to their will. It may be presumed that once the decision is reversed, the production of industrial consumer goods will pick up quite rapidly.

Farm output has been a problem for a variety of reasons. For 30 years the collective farm sector was a forced savings mine and the collective farmers were treated like serfs. The state was not interested in total farm output as such, but only in that part of it needed by the planners to carry out the center's industrialization schemes. Economically, the collective farm was a tax weapon; politically, it was a close relative of the forced labor camp. If only because of the human injury suffered by the rural population under this regime, a reversal of leadership attitudes toward the collective farm sector may not bring about an automatic increase in the volume of agricultural production. The volume of innovative ideas is no problem: vast sums of money are spent on education and research and, like everyone else, the intellectuals regularly overfulfill their plans.

For an economy striving to lift itself out of underdevelopment, the ability to generate volume of output, even on a limited front, represents strength. The fact that some goods multiply more rapidly than others is not a handicap at the beginning, when the alternative to more of some goods is no goods at all. However, this selective, quantity-biased method of growth spawns its own negation: the modern economy made up of countless interrelated, interdependent

and interchangeable parts. The economic system, rude and simple at the beginning, becomes complex, delicate, and sensitive to rough handling. In such a setting the pursuit of quantity and the storming now of this, now of the other, target, can be prejudicial to the economy's need for balance, coordination, flexibility, marginal adjustments, and the simultaneous solution of millions of equations. At this stage, quality of growth and management becomes the overriding objective.

Quality in economics may be defined narrowly or in a broad sense. It is quality in the first sense that is of urgent and immediate concern to the Soviet Union these days. In this narrow interpretation, quality means:

1. Rising factor productivity, that is, obtaining additional increments of output from the same number or fewer inputs than before. One of the most important preoccupations of the Soviet leadership today is with raising labor and capital productivity.

2. Scientific and technical progress. The problem is, first, how to generate such progress and, second, how to embody it in production on a continuing basis. Because of the day-to-day pressures of the production plan, the Soviets have a problem of striking the proper balance between basic and applied research. However, the most difficult question is how to induce enterprise managers to adopt new methods and technologies of production.

3. Correspondence of output with user demand at the least cost. In market economics, this is expressed as price = marginal cost, or price of factor = value of the factor's marginal product. The ramifications are many, the most obvious of which in the Soviet Union is expressed in the complaints of industrial and house-users about the type, assortment, styling, durability, suitability, and so on of the goods consumed.

Such dissatisfaction is a symptom of deeper ills. The most basic among these is the theoretical and pol-

icy disregard of demand, that is, of the user. Marxist economics, like its Ricardian forebear, is a science of supply based on average cost, deficient in demand analysis, utility consciousness and marginalist calculation. This doctrinal trait is given substance by the economic system built by Stalin which, in its concern with crude growth, concentrated on supply; and, with its autocratic temper, denied participation in the decision-making process to everyone except the monopoly government.

Where there is no theory of demand and just one participant making resource allocation decisions on behalf of all, the correspondence of output with user demand at something vaguely approaching least cost will emerge only by accident, if at all. In the absence of an electronic solution—such course being ruled out at present by technological obstacles—the way toward a rough correspondence of output with user demand at approximately least cost lies through decentralization of the choice-making process. This means creating autonomous nodes of decision-making power within the economic system, the nodes consisting of citizens in their capacity as consumers, producers and enterprise managers.

Like the Yugoslav economy and, to a lesser extent, the Hungarian, the Soviet economy has to be democratized. For one thing, laws governing contract and property have to be radically changed.¹ From being a technical question of economic theory, the correspondence of output with user demand at least cost quickly becomes a political question. To be effective in this particular meaning of quality, economic reform must be accompanied by a psychological reform, the dimensions of which stagger the imagination, given the intellectual climate at the top of the Soviet bureaucratic pyramid.

THE PROBLEM OF EFFICIENCY

The three aspects of economic quality in the narrow sense revolve around efficiency. The Soviet economy has to produce not just more but more efficiently; it must make better goods more cheaply. In the last analysis, the problem of efficiency hinges on methods, tools, and procedures of macro and micro management. It concerns the very nature of the economic system. The present system was originally constructed to heave the country out of underdevelop-

ment. It did this in a short time, cruelly and ruthlessly. But Stalin's engine of growth is now obsolete, nearly incapable of detecting and responding to more subtle qualitative changes, wasteful of resources, and chained to bureaucratic routine. Hence the lively debate about reform and the more hesitant attempts to translate portions of the debate into policy.

The Soviets have begun to understand that centrally unapproved spontaneity in the economic system is not necessarily anarchy, and that it is not enough to automate the production line. The social system itself must automatically perceive and adjust to new opportunities and ever wider spectra of alternative and competing choices. It is less important for Soviet output to catch up with American than for the Soviet economic system to catch up with Soviet technology. The problem is summed up in the single notion of trust. After 50 years of tutelage, perhaps the time has come for the Soviet leadership to trust its citizens; to recognize that individual human beings, when given a sense of being in control of their own destiny, are excellent adaptive mechanisms; that on the whole they respond more eagerly and constructively to generalized, indirect and positive behavioral signals than to detailed, direct and negative prods. To breathe new life into the Soviet economy what is needed is not just to change the formal organization, but to reduce it; to replace administrative coordination with a coordinative mechanism that springs from a multitude of decisions taken independently, in response to a common set of price signals, the prices themselves reflecting the choices of many participants. Years ago Bertrand Russell observed that the greater the organization, the less the liberty, and that "the larger the organization, the greater becomes the gap in power between those at the top and those at the bottom, and the more likelihood there is of oppression."² In a real sense the Soviet economic system remains oppressive.

In a wider interpretation, quality concerns the human meaning of economic life. For a long time in the West—and still today in the Soviet Union—"bigger" and "more efficient" were equated with "desirable." The quality of economic systems was considered almost exclusively within these restrictive parameters. In the last decade, this view has been challenged in the West. The seemingly endless multiplication of wants and the exploitation of the earth to satisfy those wants and stimulate new ones are no longer seen as proof of wisdom. There is a widespread if as yet vague feeling that the achievement of quality in the narrow sense may prejudice quality of economic life in a broader, more humane meaning of the term.

The paradox is common to all modern economic systems, not just to the Soviet. Decentralization of resource-allocating decisions and the concomitant pri-

¹ Valuable work on the legal implications of decentralizing the economy has been done by Svetozar Pejovich in, for example, his "The Firm, Monetary Policy and Property Rights in a Planned Economy," *Western Economic Journal*, September, 1969, and (with E. Furubotn), "Property Rights and the Behavior of the Firm in a Socialist State: The Example of Yugoslavia," *Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie*, No. 3-4, 1970. For a Soviet managerial view, see *Izvestia*, April 25, 1972, p. 3. For a Soviet inventor's view, see Ye. Yefimov, "The Innovator and the Law," *Pravda*, February 4, 1972, p. 2.

² Bertrand Russell, *Portraits from Memory and Other Essays* (New York: 1951), p. 124.

vation of transaction and property rights may indeed help produce more and better goods more cheaply, but it leaves unanswered the question of whether running ever faster and with less waste motion on the economic treadmill is worthwhile. It should be remembered that the decentralized coordinating mechanism which might make the Soviet economy more efficient postulates that rational behavior is based on egoism. Through market competition, private wants—the original name for them was “vices”—turn into public benefits in this scheme. The Soviet reluctance to decentralize and privatize is in large part traceable to the rejection of individual self-interest as the motive force of the economy, and to a lack of confidence in the ability of markets to transform private self-interest into public benefit. The practical outcome, as distinct from doctrinal presumption, has been that in the Soviet Union only public self-interest got a hearing. The assumption that a leadership issuing from revolution and self-perpetuating itself ever since knows what is best for society and for each individual is one of those Rousseauian mystifications that has well served dictators over the centuries.

QUANTITY SINCE THE 1965 REFORM

The reforms initiated in 1965 were intended to raise the quality of Soviet economic performance in the narrow sense. The original idea was to replace many administrative indicators of success by market-evolved instruments, especially prices. The idea was never fully implemented because of the reluctance of those in charge of the reform to let market instruments act in a market way. Prices in the Soviet Union still do not reflect relative scarcities, nor do they act as allocating devices. Industrial wholesale prices are insulated from state retail prices and stand in an artificial relationship to agricultural procurement prices. They are fixed centrally and cannot be changed except by administrative intervention. Using market-evolved instruments in a non-market way, that is, for administrative centralizing ends, is like trying to play Chopin's Etudes, Opus 25, on an oil drum: it can be done, but it's not the same thing. The reforms did not include consumers in the decision-making process and gave enterprise managers only the illusion of choice-making power. Even the little

power they received in 1965 has been nibbled away by the centralizers.

The first year (1971) of the ninth five-year plan and the record of the first quarter of 1972 may help give some idea of the degree to which the intent of the reforms is being fulfilled.

From the point of view of quantity, 1971 and the first quarter of 1972 have been quite satisfactory. In 1971, national income grew by 6 per cent, almost exactly as planned; gross industrial output rose by 7.8 per cent (6.9 per cent planned), with consumer goods output rising by 7.9 per cent (7.4 per cent planned). Gross agricultural output was expected to rise by 5.5 per cent. There was no increase, however, because of exceptionally unfavorable weather. Despite this, the previous year's bumper harvests of grain were maintained at a level of 180 million tons. Industrial labor productivity—a quality indicator—rose by 6.3 per cent compared with a planned increase of 5.9 per cent. Domestic output of passenger automobiles, which was 344,000 units in 1970, climbed to 529,000 units in 1971. By 1975, the plan stipulates the production of 1,260,000 passenger cars, of which 360,000 are scheduled for domestic (mainly official) use.³

Compared with the first quarter of 1971, the volume of industrial production in the corresponding quarter of 1972 increased by 7 per cent, labor productivity in industry by 5.5 per cent, the output of light industry by 4 per cent, that of food industry by 3 per cent, and the supply of cultural, everyday, and household goods by 10 per cent. The quarterly plan for industry was overfulfilled by all ministries and republics.⁴ The rates of growth of all major indicators in 1971 and of industrial output in the first quarter of 1972 were, however, below the rates required to fulfill the 1971–1975 plan. The annual average rates of growth needed to fulfill the five-year plan are: national income, 7 per cent, industrial production, 8 per cent (8.2 per cent for consumer goods), gross agricultural output, 4 per cent, and labor productivity in industry, 6.8 per cent. These planned growth rates, it should be noted, are below those attained during the preceding five-year period (1966–1970).

The quantitative performance of the economy under the reform encouraged the leaders in November, 1971, to opt for the higher range of many of the five-year plan's growth brackets and to revise slightly upward some other key targets. Gratifying as this was, the main problem which the reform set out to solve was, as we have seen, deficient quality in the narrow sense.

QUALITY SINCE THE 1965 REFORM

Here the picture is more clouded. Despite the reported overfulfillment of labor productivity norms, the array of inducements for managers to use their

³ “Report of the USSR Central Statistical Board on Results of Fulfillment of State Plan for Development of National Economy of USSR for 1971,” *Pravda*, January 23, 1972. The figures for passenger car production are from *Narodnoie khoziaistvo SSSR v 1970 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1970); *Sotsialisticheskaya industriia*, December 24, 1971; *Pravda*, November 25, 1971, and January 23, 1972.

⁴ “Report of the USSR Central Statistical Administration on the Results of the Fulfillment of the State Plan by USSR Industry in the First Quarter of 1972,” *Pravda*, April 23, 1972, pp. 1–2.

fixed capital more fully and rationally and adopt modern standards of production and output, and the upgrading of prices, the old problems are much in evidence: labor hoarding, underutilization of fixed capital, high investment costs, lengthy construction and assimilation periods, unfinished and unfinishable building projects, erratic supply schedules, resistance to innovation at the ministry and plant levels, below standard inputs, shoddy workmanship, and a hit-and-miss concordance of final output with consumer demand. The Soviet press is full of complaints by customers about suppliers, and by suppliers about the callousness of buyers. There are the usual threats by government and party officials, backed by *ad hoc* administrative measures designed to put out brush fires, but in reality working at cross purposes. In this jungle the loser is the citizen.

A few examples of quality problems under the three headings explained earlier will help clarify what is involved.

FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY

Underemployment of labor in Soviet agriculture, industry and services is notorious. So far, all attempts to reduce staffs while at the same time raising output have met with slight success. Given the low rate of natural population increase and the shortage of machine operators and other skilled and semi-skilled workers—especially acute in the developing areas of Siberia and the Far East—the need to increase labor productivity is central to the Soviet Union's determination to sustain relatively high growth rates in the future. The economic reforms of 1965–1967 clearly fell short of expectations in this respect. The economic levers they set up to this end (profit, profitability and sales as the main indicators of enterprise success, the Material Incentives Fund of the enterprise, higher money incomes and more stable procurement norms for collective farms, and other measures) appear to have been counterproductive in themselves, and at odds with the surviving rules and regulations of the administrative *ancien régime*.

The two basic causes of the reform's failure to raise labor productivity by economic means seem to be, first, the continuing emphasis by the planners on quantity of output which, despite all formalistic changes, remains the enterprise managers' first commandment, and the associated tautness of the annual plans; and second, the failure of the reform to give managers the right to determine the size, distribution and other dimensions of the enterprise wages fund. Under the rules of the Material Incentive Funds, the size of managerial bonuses is linked to the size of the enterprise's wages fund. As matters stand, for a manager to show zeal in raising labor productivity through unscheduled reductions in his work force amounts to asking the state to cut his wages fund in the following year, and

by the same token the base from which managerial bonuses are calculated. Moreover, administrative uncertainty makes it rational for the manager to keep in reserve as much labor as he can get away with, just in case. Quite often, profit, profitability, and sales targets are changed upwards at short notice: a week or two before the end of the planning period. It is comforting to have a little hoard of underutilized labor in the factory.

The reform's failure to bring the managers into the decision-making process in a meaningful way has left unchanged the previously existing conflict between the interests of the state and those of the state's enterprises. Various steps have been taken since 1967, on the spur of the moment, to remedy this situation. Their general trend has been toward administrative solutions. Thus, beginning in 1972, labor productivity targets were added to the norms handed down by the center to enterprises, and managers have been put on notice that output which does not come from such planned increases in labor productivity does not count for the purposes of bonus distribution.

On the workers' side, the fundamental reason for lukewarm enthusiasm about raising output per man-hour is simply the continuing shortage and poor quality of consumer goods, especially the latter. Higher money wages resulting from higher productivity mean very little when there are no desirable goods and services on which to spend the extra money. The reason for that state of affairs is basically the failure of the state to bring consumer preferences into the planning process in more than a *pro forma* way.

The underlying conceptual mistake is the official identification of the state with society. As long as the individuals who make up society are seen as the emanation of the state, rather than the other way around, the conflict between the interests of the government and those of the citizens will persist. Labor productivity, after all, is obtained from individual human beings, not from a lump called labor. Besides, underemployment at the full wage rate may be boring to the worker, but it is not uncomfortable. So long as it is not too blatant, one can stand around chatting, take frequent trips to the rest room, and make tea, while the customer waits. Even if one gets caught and fired, there is always an employer eager to scoop up a few extra labor reserves. So the penalty for hanging around enterprise A is to hang around enterprise B.

There remains the question of the reported over-fulfillment of industrial labor productivity norms in 1971 and the first quarter of 1972. Although it would be unfair and erroneous to dismiss the claims as statistical fabrications, part of the achievement does seem to be statistical and semantic. One piece of circumstantial evidence supports this conclusion. In 1968, enterprises already under the reform concluded

that labor productivity that year could be increased by 2.7 per cent. The planner thought 6 per cent was a more reasonable figure. The enterprise suggested rate was accordingly corrected, and on December 31, 1968, it was reported that labor productivity had risen by 6.1 per cent.

As with labor, the Soviet economy before the reform used its capital with abandon. Capital assets were allocated to state enterprises out of the state budget free of charge. Depreciation rates set by the government were too low compared to the pace of technical change in the industrialized world. The result was that a good part of Soviet machinery and equipment was obsolete, wasteful of resources domestically, and unable to compete with equivalent machines elsewhere. The stress on quantity led to standardization of equipment with little allowance for special uses. Managers, often backed by their supervisory ministries, exaggerated their requests for fixed capital allocations as a precaution against unforeseen contingencies. This, together with the aversion of Soviet workers for second and third shift work and a relatively high labor turnover in individual plants, meant that much capital stood idle or was used erratically.

The problem was compounded by a perennial shortage of spare parts and inadequate repair facilities. The Stalinist strategy of development produced technological dualism not only between sectors of the economy, but within individual industries and plants. Thus, some parts of a particular operation were mechanized, while other operations were performed by hand. Many ancillary processes, even in heavy industry, remained highly labor-intensive. Between 1959 and 1964, investment costs (the cost of a ruble's worth of output in terms of rubles' worth of resources invested in constant prices) had increased by more than half.

The reforms were intended to remedy all that. From what one reads and sees with the naked eye, they apparently did not succeed or succeeded only marginally.

To make managers conscious of the cost of capital, profitability was thenceforth to be calculated as a ratio of profits to fixed and circulating capital (rather than as a percentage of costs of production); profitability

was made one of the main criteria of enterprise success; a charge was imposed on the capital allocated to the enterprises by the state; and enterprises were encouraged to borrow from the banks. Depreciation rates were not changed by the reform. The reason why these measures failed to have the intended effect are legion, but the basic fault was that the new market-type economic tools and procedures were not sufficiently marketized. By this is meant that to be effective, interest and profitability rates must emerge from the relatively free interaction of decisions taken by many participants in the resource allocation process (they must reflect the marginal productivity of capital in different employments) and the allocative signals they then give must be observed.

In fact, despite the market-sounding names which these new tools and methods bear, they are, by and large, administrative devices. Their autonomous resource-guiding function is extremely limited; it is overshadowed by their role as a means of central control over micro-behavior. For example, the interest rate (or capital charge) does not reflect the opportunity cost of capital. It is merely an additional tax on enterprise net profits—a simple income redistribution agent. The allocation of capital to different sectors and industries is made very largely through a physical rationing system—the material technical supply network. The decision as to who is to get how much is made partly on the basis of criteria that are political, social and military, and partly in accordance with a rather confusing multitude of coefficients of investment effectiveness. In 1958, there were about 100 formulae for calculating the effectiveness of capital investments. Since then the number has increased substantially.

In practice, primary importance is frequently accorded to different indices, and not uncommonly to indices that are contradictory—profit rates, return on assets, growth rate of labor productivity irrespective of capital investments, and output quality. One enterprise's profits frequently prove to be another enterprise's losses. . . . Specialists often rely on intuition, because economic navigational instruments point in different directions at times.⁵

The whole problem, of course, is compounded by faulty prices in which computations are made.

TECHNICAL INNOVATION

The difficulty which the Soviet system experiences is not so much with generating invention—although here, too, the situation is far from satisfactory at the plant level—as with applying new ideas to production.⁶ The question is of urgent concern to the leadership because improved methods of production are the cornerstone of all attempts to raise factor productivity. The Soviets realize that unless the problem is solved, the U.S.S.R. will fall behind in the technological race in the industrialized world, even though it may outproduce such countries as the United States

⁵ N. Zenchenko, *Pravda*, February 25, 1972, p. 2. The currently used coefficient of economic effectiveness of individual construction facilities (profits as ratio of capital investment) is criticized by N. Igoshin in *Pravda*, May 4, 1972, p. 2. According to the author, if this coefficient is adhered to, "the ineffective version may sometimes prove to be effective, and vice versa." The problem seems to be that the coefficient does not take into account the time spent on the construction and assimilation of the project. According to Academician T. Khachaturov (*Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 4, 1971) the average building time for capital construction projects in the U.S.S.R. is 12 years.

⁶ "... Although we do not lag behind foreign firms on the level of scientific ideas and technical solutions, we lose years and quality at every stage of the introduction of the process, and our rate of technical progress is declining." V. Nevelsky and M. Rostarchuk, *Izvestia*, January 29, 1972, p. 2.

in steel, coal and other increasingly obsolete goods. Sluggish application of invention to production, not to mention distribution, is not limited to the consumer goods sector: it is present in such high priority industries as machine building and electronics.

By stressing profit and profitability, which depend in large part on factor productivity and technical innovation, and by making it personally worthwhile for managers to fulfill the planned profit and profitability norms, the reform has tried to encourage managers to apply innovative ideas in their plants. The reform also introduced an enterprise Production Development Fund formed from a portion of realized planned profits, and gave managers the right to use such funds—in accordance with centrally stipulated disbursement criteria—for investments outside the state plan. It was hoped that these monies would be used for technical improvements. The hopes have not materialized. Judging from the avalanche of official exhortations and administrative measures, the intent of which is to spur the assimilation of innovations, the managers, often with the connivance of their ministries, continue to shy away from all disruptions of established routine. For example, in 1970, there were 388 inventions in the light industry sector, but only 35 of these were incorporated in the plan for implementation.⁷

The basic reason seems to be the real, as distinct from formal, stress which the system puts on the fulfillment of quantity of output plans. No matter what the reform says, when quantity is the rule, it does not pay managers to halt production lines for retooling. Moreover, during the stage of design and development, the economic effectiveness of new technology is frequently overstated by the design bureaus. Managers have found that many innovations turn out to be prohibitively expensive when implemented. A good many innovations are of questionable engineering quality: much time and effort has to be spent by enterprises on "finishing work" in the process of putting these projects into production. Outlays and losses sustained by enterprises in connection with the assimilation of new technology are inadequately compensated.

The legal definition of what constitutes an invention or innovation is vague. As a result, technological processes and manufactured items which are new to a specific enterprise, but widely known elsewhere, are often included in these concepts. Since the time taken to complete capital construction projects, as we have seen, is inordinately long, by the time the project is completed, the technology is antiquated. Hence

"reconstructions" have to be made while the buildings are going up. This not only stretches out the time to completion, but it often means that the reconstructed facilities do not constitute a single technological complex or production cycle.⁸ As a result, and partly for other reasons, technology which has been created in newly commissioned plants and shops is not always fully used. There are serious problems involved in the pricing of new articles. The present pricing policy, as one manager puts it,

... leads to a situation in which enterprises find it more profitable to produce articles the production of which they have already assimilated.⁹

Applied research institutes and independent (as distinct from plant-related) research and design organizations do not, as a rule, have their own assets and do not bear legal or financial responsibility for miscalculations.

In lieu of commodity output, they submit documentation that is difficult to evaluate until it is embodied in actual products. The financial wellbeing of these organizations today depends not on the actual effectiveness of their development projects, but mainly on the volume, quantity, and complexity of the designs and reports they turn out.¹⁰

The Production Development Fund fails to stimulate innovative investments outside the state plan simply because the plan leaves few if any resources on which the fund monies could be spent. Some say that the level of payments into the fund (6 per cent of profits, on the average) is too low even to begin to think about investment initiative with all the troubles and tribulations this entails. It seems that a good portion of the monies in the fund nowadays reverts to the state by means of various administrative gimmicks, and that most of what is left is spent on repairs.

SCHIZOPHRENIA

The problem of technical innovation, like that of labor and capital productivity, exhibits the schizophrenia which grips the whole system. The center wants grassroots initiative but only of the kind that can be embodied in the center's plans. It is enough to turn the managers off, as they say, and make them yearn for the friendly warmth of routine.

The economic reforms did not allow consumer demand to influence the size, assortment and other di-

(Continued on page 186)

⁷ Ye. Yefimov, *Pravda*, February 4, 1972, p. 2.

⁸ G. Ustinov, *Izvestia*, April 29, 1972, p. 2.

⁹ G. Kulagin (General Director of the Sverdlov Machine Tool Association), *Pravda*, May 6, 1972, p. 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Jan S. Prybyla is coauthor of *World Tensions: Conflict and Accommodation* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967) and co-editor of *From Underdevelopment to Affluence: Western, Soviet and Chinese Views* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968). He is the author of *The Political Economy of Communist China* (Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook Company, 1970).

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, 1972

On May 26, in Moscow, while United States President Richard Nixon was visiting the Soviet Union, the President and Soviet General Secretary of the Soviet Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev signed a treaty agreeing to limit anti-ballistic missile systems, an interim agreement on the limitation of offensive weapons and a protocol attached to the interim agreement. The texts of the three documents follow in full:

The Treaty

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the parties,

PROCEEDING from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

CONSIDERING that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

PROCEEDING from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

MINDFUL of their obligations under Article VI of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons,

DECLARING their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

DESIRING to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between states,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE I

[1]

Each party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this treaty.

[2]

Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this treaty.

ARTICLE II

[1]

For the purpose of this treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(A) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode:

(B) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles, and

(C) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

[2]

The ABM system components listed in Paragraph 1 of this article include those which are:

- (A) operational,
- (B) under construction,
- (C) undergoing testing,
- (D) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion, or
- (E) mothballed.

ARTICLE III

Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(A) Within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of 150 kilometers and centered on the party's national capital, a party may deploy: (1) No more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers, and

(B) Within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of 150 kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a party may deploy: (1) No more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) Two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) No more than 18 ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

ARTICLE IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each party may have no more than a total of 15 ABM launchers at test ranges.

ARTICLE V

[1]

Each party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, or mobile land-based.

[2]

Each party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to

develop, test or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

ARTICLE VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this treaty, each party undertakes:

(A) Not to give missiles, launchers or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode, and

(B) Not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

ARTICLE VII

Subject to the provisions of this treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

ARTICLE VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this treaty shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

ARTICLE IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this treaty, each party undertakes not to transfer to other states, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this treaty.

ARTICLE X

Each party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this treaty.

ARTICLE XI

The parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

ARTICLE XII

[1]

For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this treaty, each party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

[2]

Each party undertakes not to interfere with national technical means of verification of the other party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

[3]

Each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion or overhaul practices.

ARTICLE XIII

[1]

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this treaty, the parties shall establish promptly a standing consultative commission, within the framework of which they will:

(A) Consider questions concerning compliance with the

obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(B) Provide on a voluntary basis such information as either party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(C) Consider questions involving unintended interference with a national technical means of verification;

(D) Consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this treaty;

(E) Agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this treaty;

(F) Consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this treaty;

(G) Consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

[2]

The parties through consultation shall establish and may amend as appropriate regulations for the standing consultative commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

ARTICLE XIV

[1]

Each party may propose amendments to this treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this treaty.

[2]

Five years after entry into force of this treaty, and at five year intervals thereafter, the parties shall together conduct a review of this treaty.

ARTICLE XV

[1]

This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

[2]

Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other party six months prior to withdrawal from the treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XVI

[1]

This treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each party. The treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

[2]

This treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of The United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America: Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.

The Interim Agreement

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the parties,

Convinced that the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and this interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitations of strategic offensive arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between states.

Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

ARTICLE II

The parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBM's, or for ICBM's of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBM's of types deployed after that time.

ARTICLE III

The parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this interim agreement, and in addition launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.

ARTICLE IV

Subject to the provisions of this interim agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this interim agreement may be undertaken.

ARTICLE V

[1]

For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this interim agreement, each party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

[2]

Each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other party's operation in accordance with Paragraph I of this article.

[3]

Each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this interim agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

ARTICLE VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this interim agreement, the parties shall use

the standing consultative commission established under Article XIII of the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems in accordance with the provisions of that article.

ARTICLE VII

The parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this interim agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.

ARTICLE XVIII

[1]

This interim agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems.

[2]

This interim agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.

[3]

Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this interim agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this interim agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other party six months prior to withdrawal from this interim agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America: Richard Nixon, President of the U.S.A.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.

The Protocol

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the parties,

Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement procedures, in the interim agreement,

Have agreed as follows:

The parties understand that, under Article III of the interim agreement, for the period during which that agreement remains in force:

The U.S. may have no more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBM's) and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet Union may have no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE SOVIET UNION

SOVIET COMMUNISM AND THE SOCIALIST VISION. EDITED BY JULIUS JACOBSON. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1972. Distributed by E. P. Dutton and Company. 363 pages, \$7.95, cloth; \$3.95, paper.)

Responsible and informed critiques of Communist societies by members of the non-Communist left are rare. This compilation of essays, originally published in the journal, *New Politics*, helps to fill a serious need. The essays discuss a variety of perennial themes: the dissident Soviet intelligentsia; the persistence of anti-Semitism in the Soviet world; the manipulative function of law; the corruption of Communist party bureaucracies; and the socio-political bases of the short-lived liberalization in Czechoslovakia in early 1968. These essays demonstrate that the non-Communist socialist left can still function in a vital and creative fashion.

A.Z.R.

DEVIANCE IN SOVIET SOCIETY: CRIME, DELINQUENCY, AND ALCOHOLISM. BY WALTER D. CONNOR. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. 327 pages and index, \$12.50.)

Deviance exists in all societies. Professor Connor provides the first comprehensive analysis of three types of primarily apolitical deviance in Soviet society. Written with commendable clarity and insight, the book is based on an exhaustive and often shrewd interpretation of Soviet data, admittedly often sketchy. One important observation is that differing views exist within the Soviet establishment on how to cope with the growing manifestations of deviance, and how these are handled is as much a political as a social problem for the leadership. This is a welcome contribution to our knowledge of Soviet society.

A.Z.R.

UNCENSORED RUSSIA: PROTEST AND DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION. EDITED, TRANSLATED AND WITH A COMMENTARY BY PETER REDDAWAY. (New York: American Heritage Press, 1972. 499 pages and index, \$10.00.)

Since 1968, an underground journal, *Chronicle of Current Events*, has circulated in the Soviet Union. It is the voice of suppressed dissent. It appears bimonthly in typed form and reaches the West through Soviet or Western tourists. Mr.

Reddaway's selections deal with commentaries by Soviet intellectuals on the Soviet government's persecution of such individuals as Solzhenitsyn, Si-nyavsky, and Grigorenko, and the use of mental institutions to break the spirit of opponents of the regime. This absorbing document affords a rare glimpse of a little known aspect of Soviet society.

A.Z.R.

MISCELLANY

HUNGARY AND THE SUPERPOWERS. BY JÁNOS RADVÁNYI. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. 197 pages, bibliography and index, \$5.95.)

The author, the highest ranking Hungarian Communist diplomat to seek asylum in the United States, contributes new insights to our understanding of the diplomacy of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. He sheds new light on the role played by Mao Tse-tung, and on the interaction of the great powers at the United Nations. There are also interesting chapters on Kadar's post-1956 policies, Hungarian-United States relations, and the Cuban missile crisis.

A.Z.R.

MAN, STATE, AND SOCIETY IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST. EDITED BY JACOB M. LANDAU. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. 532 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$5.95.)

Professor Jacob M. Landau of Hebrew University has compiled an excellent reader on the diversified and complex character of politics and political change in the Middle East. The selections are of high quality, ranging from the rule by the military in Egypt to the role of the Iraqi Communist party under Kassim to the incipient "women's lib" movement in Arab countries. The author's introductions ably integrate the various readings.

A.Z.R.

NEHRU: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. BY MICHAEL EDWARDES. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. 351 pages and index, \$8.95.)

India's first Prime Minister and great nationalist leader is the subject of this uninspired biography. Based primarily on the pionering studies of scholars, the study recounts the well-known story of Nehru's youth, his association with Gandhi, and his career as India's leader. It adds little to what is already known.

A.Z.R.

THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

(Continued from page 149)

and associated Soviet proposals for bilateral treaties of different kinds. Despite Soviet disclaimers, Moscow clearly seems to hope that these feelers might eventually lead to means of implanting and expanding Soviet influence in Asia, while containing and contracting the influence of both the United States and China. In this connection, the Soviet leaders appeared highly gratified by the outcome of the 1971 India-Pakistan war, a clear-cut Soviet political victory over post-Cultural Revolution China.

At the same time, many observers have felt that at least one subsidiary motive for the current peace offensive of the Soviets in Europe has been to secure their flank against the danger represented in Asia by China. Whether or not this consideration is a significant factor in Soviet calculations, the Chinese appear to believe that it is, and may even assign it somewhat exaggerated importance; this, in turn, may well contribute to Peking's dim view of both the projected European Security Conference and of proposals for European mutual troop cuts.

SOVIET HOPES, FEARS, AND EXPECTATIONS

In the face of this twofold turn for the worse in Sino-Soviet relations for Moscow over two decades—in the military relationship with Mao's China and in world-wide political competition with it—the thesis seems warranted that such hopes as the Soviets have for improvement may now be focused largely on the post-Mao era. The U.S.S.R. would probably welcome any advances in bilateral state relations, beyond the modest steps permitted by the Chinese in recent years in increasing Sino-Soviet trade and in returning respective ambassadors. It is possible, however, that the major Soviet hope concerns the most sensitive probable point of Sino-Soviet animosity—the territorial dispute. Soviet propaganda has seemed to suggest that Moscow holds Mao responsible for keeping this issue alive solely as a political weapon against the U.S.S.R., and that he will never agree to put the matter at rest without humiliating and unthinkable concessions by the Soviet Union. If so, the Soviets may hope that Mao's successors will feel differently. But in any event this does not solve the related problem of the steady growth of the Chinese strategic

weapons potential, which Soviet and East European propaganda, at least, tends to view as an intractable problem, of considerable concern for the future.⁸

Nor does it seem possible that Moscow can entertain anything more than rather nebulous expectations for a major post-Mao reduction in China's world-wide political competition against the U.S.S.R. Soviet propaganda over the last year or two has clearly identified these more efficient and competitive Chinese policies with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai: it has discarded previous practices and strongly attacked Chou, asserting explicitly that Chou has taken the lead in identifying the Soviet Union as China's principal enemy.

The Soviets may feel, however, that Chou, once in power, would be likely to act pragmatically and would thus keep conflict with the U.S.S.R. at less than crisis levels. In any event, other than Chou or beyond Chou, the Soviet leaders probably see very dimly. At best, they may hope rather vaguely for a new generation of Chinese leaders who will see advantages in moderating Chinese ambitions and positions in the interests of avoiding open conflict with the U.S.S.R. But here, again, Soviet expectations may not be too sanguine, given Chinese pride—and the difficulty for Moscow of identifying new leaders in the rapid rise and fall of Chinese politics.

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(Continued from page 169)

(such as the Arab-Israeli, the Iraqi-Iranian, and the South Yemen-Yemen disputes) and Arab-Western difficulties (such as those between Algeria and France, Libya and the United States, and Egypt and the United States) to market Soviet wares and to establish a substantial military, economic and political presence.

The Soviet Union has become the principal purveyor of arms in the Middle East. Its customers include Egypt, Iraq, Syria, South Yemen, Algeria and Lebanon, and the list is growing. Soviet economic credits and projects are becoming more important to Arab countries. The friendship treaties with Egypt and Iraq are diplomatic landmarks of Soviet involvement. The Soviet Union may be expected to expand its efforts to encourage a pro-Soviet orientation among the military elites controlling the intensely nationalistic, increasingly xenophobic regimes of the Middle East. However, the establishment of a presence is not synonymous with the exercise of influence; customers are not necessarily clients; and aid does not automatically make permanent friends.

The more deeply Moscow becomes involved, the more it will find itself confronted with insoluble dilemmas. For example, support for the right-wing

⁸ An unusually uninhibited expression of this concern was voiced in the Bulgarian army paper *Narodna Armiya* on May 10, 1972. Discussing Chinese weapons development in a tone of alarm, the article asserted that "the Chinese missiles will be targeted mainly at the Soviet Union," and concluded that "the Chinese leaders are already using the fact that they possess nuclear potential for political blackmail on a worldwide scale."

Baathist regime in Iraq will incur the ire of the left-wing Baathist group in Syria; participation in the buildup of Egypt's armed forces will stimulate demands for more, not less, Soviet supplies of offensive weapons (a course Moscow prefers to avoid in order not to jeopardize the détente beginning in Europe and its improved relationship with the United States); the development of Iraq as a regional force will feed suspicion in Egypt that Moscow is hedging its commitment to Cairo and will engender pressures for a countervailing Egyptian turn to West Europe; and Soviet support for the Marxist government in South Yemen will push the conservative Islamic countries of the Saudi Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf to seek better relations with the West.

The bars to Soviet penetration of the Middle East are many, and they inhere as much in the authoritarian nature of Soviet institutions and practices as in the resolve of the Middle Eastern countries to retain their independence and advance their own national interests. Nonetheless, ambition and a growing capability make the Soviet Union a major factor in the international politics of the region.

PARTY AND SOCIETY

(Continued from page 174)

modernization of Soviet society is likely to provide increasingly severe tests for such policies. The record of the post-Khrushchev years indicates that in any crisis posed by the essential conflict between totalitarian politics and social modernization, the party leadership will turn further to the right.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY

(Continued from page 180)

mensions of consumer goods production. The decision on what goods to produce, how many, and in what proportions and varieties remains the state's. It is true that the state is nowadays more sympathetic toward consumer needs, but that is not the point: exactly as before the reform, consumers have free choice—that is, they can take or leave what the government has decided to make available to them—but they do not have even the shadow of sovereignty. The only way in which consumers can let the planners know how they feel is by refusing to buy the goods offered.

CONSUMER REFUSAL

This Soviet households can nowadays afford to do, and they do it on a massive scale. As a result, personal savings are rising faster than retail sales (total personal savings at the end of 1971 amounted to more

than 53 billion rubles), and inventories of unwanted commodities rise fastest of all. Because consumer demand has not been linked to the mechanism which cranks out consumer goods, there are frequent instances of factories producing in a rush millions of rubles' worth of goods destined straight for the scrap heap. The best known examples are washing machines (roughly 1.5 million unwanted machines are produced annually from 20-year-old designs), shoes, women's, men's and children's apparel, textbooks, and various kitchen and bathroom appliances. But the list of articles which not only do not accord with consumer expectations but are often produced at high cost is longer.

Much the same is true of raw materials, semifabricates, and final producer goods supplied to manufacturers. The reason is similar: firms have not been allowed by the reform to express effectively their preferences and to bargain directly with individual suppliers on the quantity, assortment, price, and so on of the items they wish to purchase. The new profit, profitability, and labor productivity indicators frequently make it profitable for enterprises to produce goods which customers do not want: for example, expensive instead of cheap overcoats for women; fiction instead of textbooks; black and white, low sensitivity film instead of high sensitivity, color film. Most profitable of all appear to be those ancient washing machines: in 1970, the stock of these 1 cycle models quadrupled as compared with 1967; the stock doubled again in 1971. To restrain this sorcerer's apprentice, enterprises have been ordered to produce a more modern, semi-automatic "Eureka" drum-type machine. Unfortunately, the "Eureka's" power considerably exceeds the capacity of present Soviet apartment house wiring. In the reformed Soviet system, promise and reality remain far apart.

THE SALT I TEXT

(Continued from page 183)

the above-mentioned levels, in the U.S.—over 656 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, and in the U.S.S.R.—over 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers on older submarines.

The deployment of modern SLBM's on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total level of SLBM's permitted for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

This protocol shall be considered an integral part of the interim agreement.

For the United States of America: Richard Nixon, President of the U.S.A.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of August, 1972, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Middle East Crisis

(See also *Egypt, Israel*)

Aug. 17—Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan urges Egypt to accept an interim peace agreement along a dividing line across the Sinai Peninsula.

United Nations

Aug. 6—The U.N. decides to omit any mention of Taiwan in its documents and publications, including the *Statistical Yearbook*; the action is taken at Peking's insistence.

Aug. 12—Visiting in Peking, U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim urges an end to the arms race.

Aug. 25—11 members of the U.N. Security Council vote to recommend membership in the U.N. for Bangladesh; 3 members abstain and China casts its first veto vote to bar Bangladesh's membership.

Aug. 28—The U.S. sends a memorandum to all delegations at the U.N. announcing that the U.S. plans to seek a lower assessment for the next 3 years. This would lower the U.S. share of the U.N. budget from 31.52 per cent to 25 per cent.

War in Indochina

Aug. 2—North Vietnamese pound Quangtri. with 2,000 rounds of ammunition as South Vietnamese marines fight to retake the city.

Aug. 3—Allied intelligence officers report that Communist officers publicly executed hundreds of South Vietnamese government officials during the occupation of Binh Dinh Province. The total number executed may have reached 500.

The Saigon command reports that South Vietnamese troops have retaken Fire Base Bastogne, abandoned to the North Vietnamese a week ago.

Aug. 4—In Washington, a Defense Department official reports that North Vietnam has almost completed a 2d new fuel pipeline from China to Kep, a town 30 miles northeast of Hanoi.

Aug. 5—The Saigon command announces that its troops have launched a new offensive in the Parrot's Beak region of Cambodia.

Aug. 11—It is reported by *The New York Times* that rubber plantation workers within 20 miles of Saigon have been paying monthly taxes to the Vietcong without interruption since at least 1967.

Aug. 12—A U.S. Air Force announcement reveals

that in the past 24 hours B-52's carried out "probably their heaviest raids ever" over North Vietnam.

The last U.S. combat troops leave South Vietnam; some 43,500 Americans remain, mainly in administrative and supply jobs, plus the pilots and crews of 600 helicopters and 200 other combat planes and their advisers. It is reported that there are more than 60 warships and 39,000 sailors and pilots offshore. U.S. military strength in Thailand is reported at about 50,000 men, but newsmen are not allowed to enter U.S. military bases in Thailand. Some 900 combat planes are reported in the area, plus B-52's based in Guam and elsewhere.

Aug. 15—U.S. B-52's fly heavy raids near Saigon, striking targets as close as 24 miles from Saigon.

Aug. 16—The U.S. command reports that yesterday U.S. bombers crippled a key power plant in North Vietnam; the plant, extensively damaged 2 months ago, had been rebuilt.

In what appear to be the heaviest raids of 1972, U.S. fighter-bombers fly more than 370 strikes against North Vietnam.

Aug. 22—South Vietnamese military sources say that South Vietnamese forces have evacuated the northern district capital of Queson after heavy attacks by North Vietnamese forces. Allied sources in Danang, 25 miles northeast of Queson, report that the evacuation was essentially a rout, with the South Vietnamese forces abandoning tanks and artillery in their hasty retreat.

Aug. 23—A lull is reported in the fighting in the Queson region by allied sources, but it is apparent that the North Vietnamese have opened a major new front far south of the heavy fighting around Quangtri.

Aug. 24—Military sources in Saigon report that South Vietnamese troops are blocked in an attempt to retake Queson. South Vietnamese troops are still fighting to retake the Citadel of Quangtri city.

Officials in the Pentagon say that U.S. planes have attacked targets in North Vietnam within the 25-mile buffer zone between China and North Vietnam, in which U.S. planes can attack only by special authorization from Washington. Several attacks have been made over the last 4 months.

Nguyen Minh Vy, North Vietnamese delegate to the Paris peace talks, rejects a South Vietnamese offer to release 600 sick and wounded P.O.W.'s.

Aug. 25—Saigon sources report that the South Vietnamese commander in the Queson area has been relieved of his command and at least one of his battalion commanders has been arrested in the aftermath of the South Vietnamese rout by North Vietnamese troops at Queson.

Aug. 26—The South Vietnamese command claims that its forces have retaken the city of Queson; stiff North Vietnamese resistance is being reported within a few miles of the city. North Vietnamese forces cut the link between Saigon and the Mekong Delta, the main rice-producing area.

Aug. 28—The U.S. command reports that its planes bombed 5 targets at Haiphong in a heavy series of raids yesterday.

Aug. 29—The U.S. Navy command says that a 4-ship task force carried out a raid on the port area within 2 miles of Haiphong city August 27, sinking 2 North Vietnamese torpedo boats while withdrawing from the shelling attack.

Aug. 31—Intense fighting is reported in the northern province as North Vietnamese gunners intensify their artillery attack on Quangtri. The walled Citadel and other parts of the city remain in North Vietnamese hands.

ARGENTINA

Aug. 24—After a night of student rioting to protest the slaying of 16 guerrillas August 22, 600 people are arrested in university cities. The guerrillas were slain in an attempted escape from a navy air base in southern Argentina, in circumstances not fully explained.

Aug. 25—Army commanders warn that political agitation will be severely repressed; Perónists are planning mass rallies supporting the presidential candidacy of exiled former dictator Juan D. Perón. Perón has ignored the government's requirement that he return to the country by August 25 if he wants to be a candidate for the presidency.

Aug. 28—All copies of this week's Perónist weekly *Primera Plana* are seized by government order.

BANGLADESH

(See *Intl, U.N.*)

BHUTAN

Aug. 21—At a news conference, 17-year-old King Jigme Singhi Wangchuk reveals plans to open his kingdom to the world only very slowly.

CANADA

(See also *China*)

Aug. 17—In Peking, Mitchell L. Sharp, Secretary for External Affairs, announces that Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau will begin a visit to China shortly.

CEYLON

(See *Sri Lanka*)

CHILE

Aug. 4—Leaders of the opposition parties (the Christian Democratic, National, Radical Left, Democratic National and Democratic Radical parties) sign a statement declaring that democracy has ceased to exist in Chile "because the rule of constitution and law is being sidestepped to conduct the country at an accelerated rate toward a totalitarian dictatorship"; the opposition will support a single slate in the March, 1973, congressional elections.

Aug. 20—President Salvador Allende Gossens declares a state of emergency in Magallanes Province.

Aug. 22—Allende proclaims a state of emergency in Santiago Province, where protests against food shortages have been rising. Yesterday, there was a nationwide, 1-day protest against Allende's policies.

CHINA

(See also *Intl, U.N.; Canada*)

Aug. 1—Pai Hsaing-kuo, Foreign Trade Minister, leaves Peking for Peru, Chile and Canada; he expects to arrive in Canada August 15 for a 10-day visit.

It is reported from Hong Kong that a number of Chinese military leaders who had reportedly been purged and had dropped out of the public eye appeared at a reception last night in Peking to celebrate the 45th anniversary of the armed forces. The former high officials are listed by *Hsinhua*, the official press agency, as in attendance.

Aug. 5—Official population figures released in Peking reveal that, in 1970, China's population was 697,260,000; the figure, well below foreign estimates, appears in a small pocket atlas published by the China Cartographic Institute.

Aug. 12—The current issue of *Hung Chi*, the official organ of the party's Central Committee, transmitted abroad by *Hsinhua*, carries an article implicating the U.S.S.R. in the 1971 assassination plot supposedly planned by the late Defense Minister Lin Piao against Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The article charges that there was an "international background" to Lin's conspiracy. A Chinese official has also told 2 Japanese members of Parliament that Lin had been in close communication with former Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky, who died in 1967; his statement is quoted by the Japanese at a press conference in Tokyo.

Aug. 19—The New China News Agency reports that Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei has accepted an invitation to visit Canada; he was invited by Can-

ada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell F. Sharp.

Aug. 21—Canada's External Affairs Secretary Sharp announces in Peking that China and Canada have agreed to a broad exchange in the fields of culture and science, as well as other exchanges.

Aug. 28—A Harvard University computer expert reports on his return from China that China has developed 3d generation computers.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Aug. 2—*Rude Pravo*, the party newspaper, insists that liberals being tried on charges of subversion are not being punished for political opinions but because they have defied the law.

Aug. 11—In the 9th trial of subversives since July 17, a teenage woman is jailed for 42 months, receiving the longest sentence of the 46 known to have been sentenced.

Aug. 18—Gustav Husak, party leader, asserts that "no rigged and unlawful political trials are taking place or are being prepared in Czechoslovakia."

EGYPT

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Aug. 2—President Anwar Sadat and Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya issue a joint declaration agreeing to establish "unified political leadership" to unify Egypt and Libya in the fields of finance, education and political and constitutional organization.

Aug. 5—It is reported from Cairo that the withdrawal from Egypt of some 20,000 Soviet military advisers, pilots and missile crews is almost completed. Reportedly, only a few hundred technical advisers are remaining.

INDIA

Aug. 6—Emergency relief measures are ordered to fight famine after a prolonged dry spell in 13 of the 21 states.

Aug. 11—The government announces that the nation's 2d nuclear power plant is beginning to operate, in Rajasthan state. The plant was built with Canadian aid.

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East Crisis*)

Aug. 7—Israeli police arrest 18 Israeli Arabs who tried to reoccupy ruined houses in the village of Berem on the Lebanese border. The houses were destroyed by the Israeli army in 1952.

Aug. 11—Defense Minister Moshe Dayan declares that the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from Egypt will reduce the call-ups of reservists for active army duty and will allow the armed

forces to redeploy along the Suez Canal truce line.
Aug. 23—Some 3,000 Jewish and Arab demonstrators protest the government's refusal to allow Christian Arab citizens to return to their home villages of Berem and Ikrit; they were expelled in 1948 during Israel's war of independence. The government maintains that it is not in the interest of Israeli security to allow the reestablishment of Arab villages near the Lebanese border.

JAPAN

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Aug. 11—Premier Kakui Tanaka formally accepts the invitation to visit Peking extended by Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. The leaders will discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and China.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Aug. 23—Under pressure from North Korea, the Southern Korean Red Cross replaces 1 of its 7 advisers who will participate in the North-South Red Cross talks opening in Pyongyang August 30.

Aug. 30—Red Cross delegates from North and South Korea attend the opening session of the conference on unification and sign a document outlining an agenda.

LIBYA

(See *Egypt*)

MOROCCO

Aug. 16—Rebellious Moroccan air force pilots strafe the plane carrying King Hassan II as it returns from France to Rabat; later, rocket fire and machine-gun fire hit the royal palace. A government communiqué subsequently reports that the King is unharmed and that the situation is "entirely in hand."

Aug. 18—Minister of the Interior Mohammed Benhima tells a news conference that General Mohammed Oufkir, the Minister of Defense, shot himself yesterday when he learned that his role in the August 16 plot against Hassan II had been discovered.

Aug. 22—King Hassan II fires the Chief of the Navy without public explanation.

NIGERIA

Aug. 24—The Supreme Military Council assumes "full responsibility for higher education in the country," taking over all 6 universities.

PAKISTAN

Aug. 7—The government reveals that it will release all Indian civilians interned or stranded in Pakis-

tan during the Indian-Pakistani war; some 7,000 Indian nationals are estimated to be affected.

Aug. 14—Addressing the opening session of the National Assembly, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declares that Pakistanis must recognize that Bangladesh is now an independent state. The assembly is to draft a permanent constitution for Pakistan.

PHILIPPINES

Aug. 5—As food riots are reported, President Ferdinand E. Marcos says that large areas of Luzon have suffered a natural calamity of flooding "which is one of the worst we've ever known."

PORTUGAL

Aug. 9—President Américo Thomaz is inaugurated for a 3d 7-year term. Six hours before the ceremony, revolutionary dissidents bomb electrical facilities in Lisbon and Oporto; no injuries are reported, but electrical power is affected.

SRI LANKA

Aug. 19—The National Assembly adopts legislation to limit individual land holdings to 50 acres. A land commission will be empowered to allow former owners to lease acreage in excess of the 50 acres. Those who lose land will be compensated.

SYRIA

Aug. 10—President Hafez al-Assad is quoted in an interview published in Beirut, Lebanon, today, as saying that his country needs "the efforts of Soviet experts"; they will remain in Syria.

THAILAND

Aug. 8—It is reported by *The New York Times* that last week the government announced that Thailand will send a table tennis team to Peking later in August, accompanied by a high-ranking official who is expected to meet with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai.

UGANDA

(See also *United Kingdom, Great Britain*)

Aug. 4—President Idi Amin tells a contingent of paratroops that there is "no room" in Uganda for Asians, whom he terms "economic saboteurs."

Aug. 5—Amin says he is giving Great Britain 3 months to supervise the withdrawal of Asians of Indian or Pakistani origin who are entitled to British passports. Some 8,000 are affected.

Aug. 7—Britain acknowledges a "special responsibility" for some 55,000 Asians who have been ordered out of Uganda; the action is termed "highly irresponsible."

Aug. 9—Amin says that Asians with British passports

plus Asians who are nationals of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh must leave the country within 90 days. Some Asians employed in specific professions will not be forced to leave.

Aug. 15—Special British envoy Geoffrey Rippon confers with President Amin in Kampala for almost 2 hours; later, Amin says his decision to expel the Asians is firm.

Aug. 19—Amin declares that Asians who are citizens of Uganda must also leave the country within 90 days.

Aug. 22—Amin declares that Asians with Ugandan passports need not leave; the modification affects about 25,000 Ugandans.

Aug. 27—Amin says that some non-citizen Asians will be allowed to stay if specially invited by the government; it is reported that those invited will be professional and technical personnel.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Aug. 2—Nuclear physicist Andrei D. Sakharov demands that the government release 2 political dissenters from a mental hospital in Leningrad where, he charges, they are dying. Sakharov is head of the Committee on Human Rights in the Soviet Union.

Aug. 7—*Izvestia*, the government newspaper, charges that in a new Chinese atlas China has made "absurd demands" on Moscow by claiming 600,000 square miles of Soviet territory as Chinese.

Aug. 9—The newspaper *Trud* reports that aircraft and explosives are being used to combat enormous forest fires in the central Russian timberlands. Central Russia is suffering unusually hot weather and a lengthy drought.

Aug. 12—A Chinese language broadcast from Moscow reveals that Chinese-Soviet trade will reach \$290.4 million in 1972. Soviet airplanes and spare parts are the biggest items purchased.

Aug. 15—In Moscow, Jewish sources report that the government is establishing a new system of heavy exit fees ranging from \$5,000 to \$25,000 for educated Jews who want to emigrate to Israel. It is reported that the government claims the fees represent repayment to the U.S.S.R. for education. No official confirmation is obtained.

Aug. 16—It is reported by *The New York Times* that the grain harvest will be nearly 20 million tons short of Soviet goals because of bad weather.

Aug. 21—It is reported from Moscow that Jews are emigrating to Israel at the rate of 2,500 people a month.

Aug. 28—At a special meeting of party and regional officials, it is decided to import potatoes for the Moscow area from western regions of the U.S.S.R.

because unusual heat in the Moscow area has reduced the potato crop.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Uganda*)

Aug. 1—The government suggests sweeping reforms in the administration of socialized medicine; these would be the first reforms in the system since the National Health Service was established 24 years ago.

Aug. 16—Union chiefs accept a settlement offer and vote to end the 20-day dock strike. Militant shop stewards refuse to heed the union's call to return to work.

Returning from a mission to Uganda, Geoffrey Rippon, special envoy, says that the government's main aim must be to "mitigate the hardship" involved for Ugandan Asians who must leave Uganda.

Aug. 18—Rebuffing the shop stewards, dock workers vote to return to work.

Home Secretary Robert Carr announces the establishment of a board to help resettle Ugandan Asians with British passports who have been ordered to leave Uganda.

Aug. 29—The government freezes a \$24.5-million loan to Uganda as a warning against the threatened policy of expulsion of all Asians.

Northern Ireland

Aug. 2—In a new surge of guerrilla activity, hundreds fight in the streets of Belfast.

Aug. 7—Opposition party leaders representing the Roman Catholic community ask for an end to the policy of interning suspected terrorists as a condition for talks with British officials.

Aug. 10—William Whitelaw, the British administrator for Northern Ireland, flies to London for a conference with Prime Minister Edward Heath.

Aug. 16—The government offers a \$125,000-reward for information leading to the arrest of those responsible for 54 assassinations in Northern Ireland in the last 5 months.

UNITED STATES

Economy

Aug. 4—The Labor Department reports that the unemployment rate in July remained at the improved June rate of 5.5 per cent; another rise in food prices caused a marked increase in the Wholesale Price Index.

Aug. 24—The Commerce Department reports that although there was a decrease in the United States foreign trade deficit in July, the trade deficit for this year now totals \$3.9 billion, more than in any full year in our history.

Foreign Policy

Aug. 1—Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, confers for the second time in two weeks with North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris.

Aug. 9—The Agriculture Department says that it believes that the Soviet Union will purchase \$1 billion worth of agricultural products from the United States over the next 12 months.

Aug. 18—Kissinger concludes two days of talks with President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam in Saigon.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers tells Jewish leaders that the United States has expressed its concern to the Soviet Union over the new, high fees charged to Soviet Jews who desire to emigrate.

Aug. 19—Kissinger meets with Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka at Karuizawa, Japan, before leaving for Washington, D.C.

Aug. 24—Secretary Rogers says it would be contrary to United States interests to pressure the Greek government to change its policies. He says 6 United States destroyers will take up station in the Athens area next month under the home port agreement with Greece reached earlier this year.

Aug. 31—President Nixon meets Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka in Hawaii for a 2-day conference.

Government

Aug. 1—By a vote of 59 to 33, the Senate rejects Senator George McGovern's (D., S.D.) amendment to a military appropriation bill that called for holding defense expenditures to last year's level of \$77.6 billion. The administration has requested \$85.7 billion.

A study made by the Tax Foundation, Inc., of New York claims that federal, state and local government payrolls rose by 88 per cent, to \$110 billion, during the decade 1960-1970.

Aug. 2—By a vote of 49 to 47, the Senate adopts an amendment calling for the withdrawal of all American forces from Indochina in four months, providing there is a concurrent release of United States prisoners of war.

Aug. 3—The Brookhaven National Laboratory says that radiation levels in humans have decreased steadily since the 1963 treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere.

The Senate approves the treaty with the Soviet Union limiting defensive missiles, by a vote of 88 to 2.

Aug. 10—The Defense Department sets the cost of renewed heavy bombing and naval activity since the North Vietnam offensive at \$1.1 billion during the current fiscal year.

By a vote of 228 to 178, the House of Representa-

tives rejects an amendment demanding the withdrawal of all American forces from Indochina. It appears that Congress will not pass such legislation during this session.

Aug. 16—President Richard M. Nixon vetoes a \$30.5-billion appropriation bill for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Department of Labor on the ground that it appropriates \$1.8 billion more than he requested. The veto is sustained by the House.

Aug. 20—President Nixon signs the \$1.6-billion flood relief bill.

August 28—President Nixon predicts that the United States will be able to end peacetime conscription by July, 1973.

Aug. 29—The Price Commission denies price increases on 1973 models to the General Motors Corporation and the Ford Motor Company. This will maintain present price levels until at least a few weeks after the 1973 models go on sale in September.

Military

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Aug. 29—Presidential press secretary Ronald Ziegler announces that American forces in Vietnam will be reduced by 12,000 more men by December 1. This will lower the authorized military strength there from 39,000 to 27,000 men.

Politics

Aug. 4—Arthur H. Bremer is found guilty of the shooting of Governor George C. Wallace of Alabama and three other persons at Laurel, Md., May 15. He is sentenced to 63 years in prison.

The American party nominates former Republican Congressman from California John G. Schmitz as its presidential candidate after Governor Wallace declines the nomination.

Senator George McGovern (D., S.D.) offers the Democratic nomination for Vice President to Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D., Me.).

Aug. 5—Senator Muskie declines Senator McGovern's offer.

Senator McGovern names R. Sargent Shriver as his choice for Vice President. Shriver was the first director of the Peace Corps under President John F. Kennedy, and served as director of the anti-poverty program under President Lyndon B. Johnson before being named Ambassador to France.

Aug. 8—The Democratic National Committee nominates Sargent Shriver to replace Senator Thomas F. Eagleton (D., Mo.) as the party's candidate for Vice President.

Aug. 9—Former Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally announces the formation of a "Democrats

for Nixon" committee for the presidential campaign.

Aug. 16—Former President Lyndon B. Johnson endorses Senator McGovern for President.

Aug. 22—The Republican National Convention renominates President Richard M. Nixon for the presidency. The party platform is adopted; a plan to give greater delegate representation to the larger, more urbanized states at the 1976 convention is rejected.

Aug. 23—The convention renominates Spiro T. Agnew for Vice President. Agnew and President Nixon deliver their acceptance speeches.

Senator McGovern and Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago meet in Chicago.

Aug. 24—Former Secretary of Commerce Maurice J. Stans, who is now President Nixon's chief fundraiser, says under oath that he does not know how \$114,000 in contributions ended up in the possession of a man arrested in the break-in at the Democratic headquarters in Washington on June 17, 1972.

Aug. 26—The General Accounting Office says that up to \$350,000 in contributions to the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President may be in violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act.

Aug. 29—In a speech before the New York Society of Security Analysts, Senator George McGovern outlines his program of tax reforms and moderates his approach to welfare reform.

At a news conference in San Clemente, President Richard Nixon says that both Democratic and Republican parties have apparently committed "technical violations" of the campaign spending and reporting law.

Aug. 30—The General Accounting Office declares that it will look into the campaign finance records of Senator McGovern.

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)


(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Aug. 5—President Nguyen Van Thieu issues a decree controlling the press; apparently this will close many newspapers in South Vietnam.

Aug. 6—Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy is dismissed in the wake of a scandal involving mismanagement of the government's multimillion-dollar military savings fund.

Aug. 14—A South Vietnamese official denies *New York Times* reports of the torture of political prisoners.

Aug. 15—A South Vietnamese senator charges that 920 innocent people, "mostly women and children," are being held as Communist sympathizers without trial in the Con Son island prison. The senator has just visited the prison.



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